



(Non)Commemoration of the Heritage of Central and Eastern Europe

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(Non)Commemoration of the Heritage of Central and Eastern Europe

Students' conference proceedings

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Introduction

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To say that we live in a turbulent times would be an understatement and a tiresome cliché. In the blink of an eye, the unthinkable and the impossible is becoming the ordinary of the everyday life of the burnout society, to borrow Byung-Chul Han's celebrated term.¹ The ubiquity of the crisis made it dissolve in desensitisation, making us almost immune to surprise. Shamelessness became the *modus operandi* of the contemporary politics, infecting in varying degrees everyone (thus leaving a latent inflammation even when the official politicians of shamelessness lose the elections) and questioning the limits of the universality of the democratic dream.

It is hard not to fall into defeatism, while the Four Riders of the Apocalypse are on their way.² The plague and the spectre of its repetition haunting the times in which “back to

¹ Byung-Chul Han, *The Burnout Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

² Slavoj Žižek, *Freedom. A Disease Without Cure* (London: Bloomsbury Academics, 2023), 253–256.

normal” and “never the same” coexist in paradoxical symbiosis. The war(s), including the one on the other side of EU’s external border and acts of undeclared hybrid war on this very boarder. The famine as a consequence of the above as well as climate change which year by year leaves behind larger and larger tracts of burned land. And the death itself, that Žižek understands not only as a result of the other three, but also as ontological threats to *being-human* posed by digital control.³ However, taking into consideration that it is always already too late,⁴ and all that is left is to act in the state of permanent belatedness, defeatism not necessarily leads to the affirmation of the decay. Regardless of whether we have enough imagination and courage to find an incentive to revolution in the disintegration, we can still draw intellectually from the position we find ourselves in.

In all this, heritage remains another battlefield, taking on conventional blows of naked force – bombs, missiles or looting – as well as playing crucial role in more or less sophisticated memory wars. The questions on who gets to be commemorated, by whom and in what way, who should be erased or publicly pushed into oblivion may have always had the same relevance, but never before have they been spoken so loudly.

This book is a result of a student-doctoral conference that took place on January 12, 2024 at the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Reasons for setting its focus on Central Eastern Europe were twofold.

³ *Ibid.* p. 255.

⁴ Slavoj Žižek, *Too Late To Awaken. What Lies Ahead When There is No Future?* (Penguin Books Ltd, 2023), 144.

Firstly, CEE became the frontier of the war which may influence the shape, definition and position of the region in Europe. Secondly, combining experience of “internal colonialism”⁵ by the West and the East with its own multi-layered and quasi-colonial history, CEE is a subject that requires a separate look that goes beyond the master gaze on a semi-periphery.

The opening chapter written by Roksolana Kharachko tackles multifaceted struggle for Ukrainian heritage, which this time is also a fight for survival. Right after Ukraine had made a significant turn in its approach to its heritage, abandoning the previous binarism which since 1991 had been throwing her between post-Soviet and Russian imperial nostalgia (Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency) and national memory narrative (times of Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko), Russian aggression posed an existential threat. Kharachko stresses the process of decolonization and decommunization, which since 2022 with redoubled force takes the form of derussification, but in a country with such a multi-source culture and complex history is never an easy endeavor. In her chapter, Kharachko discusses also Russian physical and propaganda actions to destroy, invalidate or appropriate Ukrainian heritage. The purpose of Russian action is particularly visible in the selectivity of attacks: destruction of memorials of Taras Shevchenko and victims of the Holodomor and preservation of statues of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

⁵ Britta Timm Knudsen, John Oldfield, Elizabeth Buettner and Elvan Zabunyan, “Introduction”, in *Decolonizing Colonial Heritage. New Agendas, Actors and Practices in and beyond Europe*, ed. Britta Timm Knudsen, John Oldfield, Elizabeth Buettner and Elvan Zabunyan (London and New York: Routledge 2022), 3.

In the second chapter, Wojciech Ćwikowski and Paweł Janik investigate Holocaust-focused educational discourses present in Ukrainian curricula and textbooks. Using Critical Discourse Analysis supported by linguistic text analysis, authors conducted a thorough analysis of eleven school textbooks and curricula of courses devoted to “History of Ukraine” and “World History”. The analysis is preceded by an introductory description of the post-Soviet context, when the “normative non-remembrance” had to be replaced by narrative strategies created by a country that still had not agreed on its memory models. Ćwikowski and Janik examine what in collective memory is stressed out, what is omitted and which strategy is represented by the current Ukrainian educational discourse.

The third chapter written by Bartosz Jakubczyk takes us to the level of European community and focuses on the EU’s engagement in the protection and promotion of European heritage. The author provides us with the historical context, starting with the EU’s reluctance to involve with an issue at that point associated mainly with national concern, through the Maastricht Treaty that became a game-changer in the EU’s approach to the heritage, up to current programmes together with legal framework for heritage protection. Jakubczyk draws attention both to successful cases, like the one of Umeå (Sweden) that made full use of the title of the European Capital of Culture of 2014, and the stories of more humble results, like the one of Riga that was granted the same title also in 2014 and failed to attract a larger audience from other member states.

In the fourth chapter, Bartłomiej Kural points to the role of cuisine in shaping national and local heritage. The author

uses the case of obwarzanek krakowski, parboiled braided ring-shaped bread from Kraków, as a starting point for the analysis of the protection of food heritage at the international (UNESCO), European and national level. Furthermore, Kural presents the history of this local pastry, its properties and its significance for the local community.

The fifth chapter goes beyond Central and Eastern Europe, but remains within the community of (permanent?) otherness. Marek Matyjanka discusses the multilayered (both in a metaphorical and literal sense) heritage of Skopje. A city razed to the ground by both natural disasters (the earthquake of 1963) and the wild imagination of nationalist politicians (pompous project of Skopje 2014) is a place of search, production and fight for Macedonian identity. Matyjanka grasps this rhizomatic entanglement that crosses the Antiquity, Turkish Empire and Yugoslavia, Alexander the Great and Josip Broz Tito, heritage imagined, aspirational and hidden.

In the last chapter, Filip Koźmiński and Damian Szczerbicki show an attempt to impose a cult of Lenin on a village in Southern Poland, Poronin, where the future leader of the October Revolution and his wife spent several months. The authors describe the resistance of the local population (which was also a resistance against the authority itself) and post-transformation rejection of this imposed heritage. Interestingly, Lenin's episode in Poronin is often forgotten even by his biographers, but as Koźmiński and Szczerbicki point out, the scarce memory of the event survived not so much because of the effectiveness of the actions of the then authorities, but because of the resistance with which they were met.

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Contemporary Production of Heritage in the Context of Russia-Ukrainian War

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Abstract

In the midst of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the contemporary shaping of heritage emerges as a multiperspectival phenomenon shaping narratives, memory and identity within the Eastern Region. The chapter explores the intricate dynamics of heritage creation in the context of ongoing war, focusing on socio-political implications and cultural ramifications within the affected communities.

The conflict has sparked a fervent re-evaluation and re-interpretation of historical narratives, with both Russia and Ukraine employing heritage as a tool to reinforce national identities and assert territorial claims. Museums, memorials, and commemorative practices have become battlegrounds for competing historical narratives, reflecting divergent perspectives on the shared past. Simultaneously, the war has led to the destruction of cultural heritage sites, exacerbating tensions

and intensifying debates about the preservation of collective memory.

The chapter investigates how heritage production intersects with propaganda, memory politics, and the construction of national myths in the context of the conflict. It explores the role of digital media, social networks, and grassroots initiatives in shaping alternative narratives and challenging official discourses. Furthermore, it delves into the ethical dilemmas surrounding the (re)construction of heritage amidst ongoing violence, displacement, and human suffering.

The chapter also discusses the impact of heritage production on social cohesion, identity formation, and reconciliation efforts within the affected communities. It considers the potential of heritage as a catalyst for fostering understanding, dialogue, and peace-building initiatives amidst the divisive nature of the conflict. I aim to shed light on the intricate ways in which the Russian-Ukrainian war influences the contemporary production of heritage, highlighting its role in shaping perceptions, preserving memory, and influencing socio-cultural dynamics in the midst of a protracted conflict.

Keywords: Heritage production, Ukrainian culture, War in Ukraine, Cultural heritage, Cultural preservation, War and heritage, Heritage interpretation, Memory politics, National identity, Social construction of heritage

Introduction

The war between Russia and Ukraine changes history, not only through the actions of politicians but also through the symbols and shared culture that influence people. This research will touch upon both the concrete and the conceptual facets of heritage; however, its main emphasis will lie on the physical remains of history – such as architecture, landscapes, and relics – since they serve as powerful reminders of the ongoing conflict and its roots. This chapter provides insights on the purposeful curation and destruction of these physical remnants amid the turmoil.

The insightful peek into the destabilizing effect that the destitution of cultural objects has on society addresses and reveals the stories of disinformation and political games that frequently accompany such events but are more frequently left on the background. The specific sociocultural repercussions of the conflict, specifically as expressed in those items, were to be examined. The findings of this study can have a significant impact on the formulation of cultural policies and the preservation of cultural heritage during periods of geopolitical tension in general and warfare in particular. Because such notions are highly relevant for researchers, policymakers, and cultural workers, who must deal with the war's connection with cultural works as an interactive theme.

Key questions driving the exploration include: how are Russia and Ukraine instrumentalizing these physical cultural expressions to reframe or uphold their national identities and to justify their ownership of territories? How does the physical elimination of these cultural sites impact the col-

lective and individual memories and identities of the people involved, and what does it imply about restoring those sites? What are the current challenges in restoring, producing, and preserving these physical cultural expressions within an active conflict?

The prolonged animosity and geopolitical tensions that led to the Russian-Ukrainian war eruption have sparked a critical reevaluation of historical identities. The two states actively engage public spaces of memory – the halls of museums, the spreading trees of memorial sites – in support of their national pretensions to identity and statehood. The chapter additionally explores the ethical challenges of resurrecting the physical remains of heritage, forcing the reader to grapple with the age-old question of how to conduct “life as usual” amid a tragic human event.

Cultural Heritage Unveiled: Shaping Social Thought, Identity, and Political Narrative

The preservation of the past, the creation of historical memory, and the formation of national consciousness are among the main functions of historical and cultural heritage. As a visual element, which includes monuments and memorial complexes, sites, houses-museums, exhibits, cemeteries, and individual burials, they all create a common coordinated concept or a memorial space. It not only testifies to the specific historical epochs but also influences the formation of public opinion bases.

The study of historical and cultural heritage emphasizes expanding scientific research space. It calmly develops in the current context of global ideas or values and plays an organic function in constructing historical memory in the historical

consciousness. All this helps to preserve a holistic informational field, to promote justice concerning the general description of the past with the help of objects of historical and narrative memory. Thus, the system of construction of historical and cultural heritage is a driving force that protects historical truth and actively causes the development of ideas and values of society. Thus, neighborhoods are being destroyed, and the names of cities, villages, streets, and enterprises are repeatedly renamed so that the honour of party and state figures is consistent.

One of the direct consequences of this process is the demolition of monuments from the past. The memorial space finds itself subjected to ideological dictates, with monuments only being allowed in this form in compliance with the “totalitarian regime” already in place. Governments hold various types of events, the erection of memorials and obelisks, numerous artistic creations such as “requiems” and “places of memory”, the invention of elaborate “rituals of memory” with the help of which the ruling party actively employs to give the state ideology to the status of law. The authorities, in this case, are not limited to the ruling party as a whole, as local authorities are equally implicated at the levels of the municipality and the village, which is reflected in the construction or at least in the restoration of certain monuments, as well as the urban environment, designed so that citizens should have an interpretation of the past beneficial to the official historical narrative. A noticeable change has taken place in the process of changing the space of the country’s memorial in relation to monuments. Democratic local communities independently make the decision to install or dismantle them. Here, it is worth noting that

in some regions and cities, the creation of nationally oriented memory is actively resisted by the local population.¹

Thus, when it comes to Ukraine, in the context of changing the ruling government and regime, both the perspective on history and the cultural perception, as well as formation, were changing. Before 1991, the regime imposed the communist point of view, and, during that time, only the imperialistic Russian perspective had a place. In contrast, the rapid changes started from the year 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence. The period of Viktor Yanukovich's presidency from 2010 to 2014 was characterized by a resurgence of the Soviet memory narrative. This phase can be described as a phenomenon where "the Soviet identity concert took the stage again". Furthermore, the years of Yanukovich's rule were marked by the development of identity politics that can be referred to as pro-Russian. Such politics viewed Ukrainian nationalism as an existential threat to the Russian-linguistic east of Ukraine. In contrast, the presidencies of Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko can be called "the phase of physical removal of the places of memory of the Soviet nostalgic and Russian imperial nostalgic narratives". Notably, the latter two administrations can be called the period of the dominance of the national memory narrative. Thus, these presidencies signify the start of alternative memory politics that deliberately turned to face Ukraine away from the Soviet and Russian imperial past. The new era commenced with the beginning of Volodymyr Zelensky's

¹ Denysenko, Galyna, and Helena Denysenko. "The Cultural Heritage of Ukraine in the Formation of the Historical Memory of People." *Kraieznavstvo* 1 (2014): 139–50.

presidency in 2019. In terms of this era, changes are also relevant to the political actors engaged in the construction of Ukraine's mnemonic field, while the attitude to the Soviet heritage performed a continuation of the course outlined in the prior years. However, in addition to the traditional story of the mnemonic warriors, another, new wave of memory activism has appeared in Ukraine: a group of pluralists. Unlike the first group, pluralists not only recognized the rest of society could have a different version of the past, but they also demanded the right of others to their vision. Together, these proponents of a properly conducted dispute formed the basis for a peaceful dialogue in the memory space of the country. It should be noted that the country's historical memory "exploded" in many respects from a clear and dichotomous story, becoming a multifaceted discourse.²

After the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 the cultural heritage and its preservation was one of the key aims for the Ukrainian government and people. It is the war that is triggering a process of its full revision and further deconstruction. Cultural heritage aims to enhance the feeling of the society of incorporation among the Ukrainian citizens, to unite people, and to distinguish the national identity, which is in the given case crucial. Unlike many other nations, Ukraine did not formulate its own culture totally by itself. Therefore, the heritage of Ukraine is complex, as it has multiple layers, each corresponding to a different "mnemonic regime." The latter

² Betlii, Olena. "The Identity Politics of Heritage: Decommunization, Decolonization, and Derussification of Kyiv Monuments after Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine", *Journal of Applied History* 4, 1-2 (2022): 149-169.

term signifies a set of attitudes regarding physically palpable objects of memory that are designed to pay tribute to figures and events coming from Soviet or Russian context.

The modern shaping of Ukrainian culture can be divided into several processes of deconstruction: decommunization and decolonization. Decommunization is understood as a broad and metaphorical concept, meaning a break from the communist ideology. That is, it implies a break from the “body” of manifestations of this ideology in public space and social life. However, not in a literal sense but in moral and social reconciliation with the past, it is often expressed in the reversal of organic systemic expressive supports, lustration, and more profound changes of a socio-economic nature. Typical for decommunization is a direct metaphorical tie: to change the toponymy, to destroy the object of the symbol to the undesirable period.³

Decolonization is the act of resistance to colonial powers and is returning all political, economic, educational, and cultural powers to nations that have been forcibly deprived of such power by imperial powers. Colonization involves a situation when one group dominates and controls the land, resources, languages, cultures, and relationships of another group while decolonization is a way by which the formerly colonized group reclaims these rights. “Colonization is violence and trauma. Decolonization is the therapy and the cure

³ Jędraszczyk, Katarzyna. “Trzydzieści Lat Dekomunizacji Na Ukrainie.” *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 19, no. 2 (December 2021): 125–45. <https://doi.org/10.36874/riesw.2021.2.7>.

to help heal this trauma”.⁴ Decolonization takes place in two aspects: the institutional and the individual, and in each, the goal is to take the mask from the facades of empire culture, which politics of hypocrisy have made significant.

Institutional decolonization includes several governmental actions aimed at recovering the independence of the state in terms of its politics, economics, and culture. These include the most significant declarations related to the independence – the proclamation of sovereignty in 1991, the law on the Day of Remembrance of the Holodomor in 2007, and the laws of decommunization in 2015.⁵ The President of Ukraine Zelenskyy, Volodymyr, in 2023, signed Law of Ukraine No. 7253 “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Geographical Names” regarding the decolonization of toponymy and streamlining the use of geographic names in populated areas of Ukraine.” In particular, it is prohibited to assign the names of Ukrainian geographical objects that glorify, popularize, or symbolize the Russian State. Decolonization captures the symbols of the aggressor state in all historical forms listed in it, as well as persons who held positions of leadership in state and management bodies, political parties, the ruling party of the

⁴ Pedorenko, Maria. “A Cure for Colonial Trauma: What Is Decolonization and What Do Ukrainians Have to Do With It?” *Заборона*, March 30, 2023. <https://zaborona.com/en/what-is-decolonization-and-what-do-ukrainians-have-to-do-with-it/>. (accessed 14.02.2024).

⁵ I.a. “On the condemnation of Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and banning the dissemination of their symbols”, *Про засудження комуністичного та націонал-соціалістичного (нацистського) тоталітарних режимів в Україні та заборону пропаганди їхньої символіки*, *Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР)*, 2015, no. 26, p. 219.

aggressor state, the army entity of the Russian Federation, as well as territorial entities.⁶

The second approach to the concept implies that decolonization should occur in the mental and cognitive states of the citizens, meaning that the change is to occur in the thinking and belief. This is why the concept of derussification is quite new and refers to the deepness of decolonization in the country within 2022. It is aimed to show that there is a certain change intended to destroy all Russian labels from various sectors, including art or culture, religion, language, politics, or the entire society. Most likely, it will replace the terms decolonization and decommunization in the future since it is less theoretical.

Cultural Heritage as a Battleground: Russia's Dual Assault

There are two ways Russia is destroying Ukrainian cultural heritage. The first method is physical, which includes artillery and other types of weapons to destroy different objects, such as chaos and museums, and mental, which is manipulating through information and propaganda. From February 24, 2022, due to Russian aggression, 863 objects of cultural her-

⁶ Буняк, Валерія. “Закон Про «Іақио;Деколонізацію&трақио;: Зеленський Затвердив Заборону Географічних Назв, Пов’язаних з Росією.” *detector.media*, April 22, 2023. <https://detector.media/infospace/article/210428/2023-04-22-zakon-pro-dekolonizatsiyu-zelenskyu-zatverdyy-zaboronu-geografichnykh-nazv-povyazanykh-z-rosiieyu/>. (accessed 14.02.2024).

itage have been destroyed or damaged by the Russian army. However, the issue of the narrative is not limited to the physical side, as it extends to the very essence of the communities facing the complexities of war. Thus, the material side will be explored in more depth in the following part of this chapter, since it is the primary object of the study.

While violently entering Ukraine with a full-scale invasion, the primary Kremlin propagandist and President of the Russian Federation precisely told his story. Putin highlighted an ideology that firmly binds the history of Ukraine with the history of Russia, disagreeing with all matters of separateness. Furthermore, Putin paid particular attention to the ostensible togetherness and commonality of Russia and Ukraine.⁷ In one of his speeches in 2013, Putin went deep into various theses on Ukraine, its ethnogenesis, and historical ties.⁸ The head of the Russian state noted that Ukraine and Russia have common roots because they originated from Kyiv's principality.

This statement, however, simplifies a far more complex history that delineates Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians as distinct. On the one hand, Putin claimed that inhabiting foreign states did not diminish the Ukrainians' and Russians' essential unity of 'common spiritual values.' This perspective, however, offers an oversimplification of the history. Firstly, as

⁷ Transcript: Vladimir Putin's Televised Address on Ukraine, February 24, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24>.

⁸ The Kremlin: Orthodox-Slavic values: The foundation of Ukraine's civilisational choice conference; 2013 July 27. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18961>. (accessed 14.02.2024).

stated before, the Mongol Invasion split the Rus into two. The northern part with current Belarussia and Russia remained under Mongol influence and Western integrated into Poland and Lithuania. While modern Ukraine did not exist per se at that point, the territories made significant steps culturally and politically. Ukraine, in a broad sense, advanced due to the influence of Polish and Lithuanian Renaissance and Reformed ideology until the years of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Hetmanate. Moscow, meanwhile, stayed relatively uninvolved in these developments. The second half of the 19th century saw the term 'Russia' instead of Moscovy due to its claims to reunite the lands of Rus and inheritance of the 3rd Rome legacy after Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Empire. Hence, while Putin refers to common beginnings, history saw a different political culture and language development perspective of the three Eastern Slav peoples.⁹

On February 21, 2022, Vladimir Putin argued that Modern Ukraine is a purely Russian state, meaning Bolshevik, communist Russia. The process, according to him, began immediately after the 1917 revolution. At that time, Lenin and his comrades did so rather harshly, and a part of Russia's historical lands seceded and separated from the rest. He stated that millions of people then living in this territory were not asked about this at all. This is how the territory of Soviet Ukraine was formed, which, in his words, is still rightfully Russian and can be called "Ukraine named after Volodymyr

⁹ Düben, Björn Alexander. 2023. "Revising History and 'gathering the Russian Lands': Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian Nationhood". LSE Public Policy Review 3 (1): 4. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.86>.

Ilyich Lenin”.¹⁰ At the same time, the history implies that in the late 18th century, Ukrainian territories were part of the Russian and Austrian empires. It was already during the 19th century when Ukrainians discovered the feeling of their nation and met the resistance of the imperial powers. In particular, the Russian Empire issued its decrees during the 60s and 70s to prevent the Ukrainian language’s spread. Nevertheless, political parties were established to specify what should be the future of the Ukrainian lands. After the fall of Russian autocracy, in 1917, the Central Rada was formed in Kyiv. This moment represented it was possible to create a democratic state. Even though the Bolshevik waged a successful war against the Ukrainian Republic, the experience of state-building was crucial for the development of Ukrainian culture. In 1917–1918, the Ukrainian People’s Republic determined some of the symbolic national elements. Nevertheless, the desire to have an independent Ukraine has never faded, which finally presented itself to the world in 1991 having received overwhelming public support.¹¹

Damaging or confiscating distinctive Ukrainian cultural heritage sites and possessions serves as a tool to undermine Ukrainian identity and legitimize Russian propaganda. Arguing that these places and objects belong to Russian heritage rejects the separate existence of Ukrainian culture and nation

¹⁰ Тасс. “Путин: Современная Украина Целиком и Полностью Была Создана Коммунистической Россией.” ТАСС, February 21, 2022. <https://tass.ru/politika/13791307>. (accessed 14.02.2024).

¹¹ Уїнп. “Спростовуємо Російський Міф, Що Україну Створив Ленін”, n.d. <https://uinp.gov.ua/aktualni-temy/sprostovuyemorosyyskyu-mif-shcho-ukrayinu-stvoryv-lenin>. (accessed 14.02.2024).

apart from Russian ones. The Russian aggressor purposefully targets elements of Ukrainian heritage that contradict Russia's historical narrative. They aim to erase heritage supporting the notion of a distinct Ukrainian nation. Examples include the destruction of museums and monuments dedicated to Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national poet, as well as those commemorating victims of Soviet terror and the Holocaust. While monuments of Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, seen positively in Russia, remain untouched, and those honoring the Holodomor victims are frequent targets. Russian authorities downplay the Holodomor as a 'tragedy' affecting various ethnic groups, denying its genocide against the Ukrainian nation. There's also suspicion of destroying a regional archive containing Soviet-era secret police files.¹²

Echoes in Ruin: The Material Heritage and its Silent Testimony in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

This part of the chapter provides in-depth analysis of the specific strategic targeting of Ukrainian cultural heritage. In this regard, the attacking state, which is Russia, specifically seeks to progressively destroy Ukrainian national identity and endeavor to reinforce its contested historiographical claims. Research aims to shed light on the issues connected with direct bombing and shelling of the physical representations of

¹² Christoph Mick (2023) *The Fight for the Past: Contested Heritage and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, *The Historic Environment: Policy & Practice*, 14:2, 135–153, DOI: 10.1080/17567505.2023.2205703.

a people's histories, such as monuments, museums, historic buildings, and archaeological sites that are knitted together as a nation's cultural code. The serious damage and loss of historical remnants of the conflict are more than possible, in this case, and threaten to obliterate many architectural structures and masterpieces that have survived for centuries.

Before the hostility's outbreak, Ukraine's cultural landscape was distinguished by its huge range of material heritage, comprising over 170,000 documented objects extending across archaeological, historical, architectural, and monumental art domains. There were more than 140,000 objects registered by local authorities, this list includes archaeological remains, historical monuments and urban plans. Ukrainian museums and ancient reserves, of which there were more than 2,500, vary in scope and singularity from each other. In general, there were 1,400 cities and towns, and over 8,000 villages with these objects. Besides, there was a list of historic towns and urban-type settlements, which included 401 positions, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.¹³

However, the safeguarding of this heritage has been facing significant challenges, especially in the context of a complex and multifaceted Ukrainian history that often became the focal point of both domestic and international discourse. Above all, the legislation on de-Sovietization led to a dilemma related to the preservation or removal of certain objects. In many large cities, activists and local governments could not reach the consensus regarding the fate of the relics that hon-

¹³ “Культурна Спадщина України”, n.d. <https://ciss.org.ua/ua/kulturna-spadschina-ukraiini.html>.

our former oppressors. This put the societies in confrontation, forcing them to decide whether that part of the past should be completely forgotten or remain, and if it remains, to define the extent of its presence in today's life. This contradiction can be well illustrated by the example of Volodymyr Patyk's art in Lviv.¹⁴ His mosaic, "The ocean", which was created in 1982, was first destroyed by the authorities because it was considered Soviet, however, given that the artist had nothing to do with the Soviet authorities and the regime of those times, Lviv local government decided to restore the mosaic. Although the restoration of the mosaic was a very positive aspect, some believe that the restoration is somewhat different from the original work of the artist, and therefore, due to the wrong decision of the government, the work has lost its value.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a key moment in the assault on Ukraine's cultural heritage. The peninsula's rich historical tapestry was subjected to politically motivated distortions and the Russification of its history.¹⁵ This conflict led to over 13,000 deaths and displaced more than 1.5 million people. One of the consequences was that Ukraine lost access to its cultural treasures located in Crimea and lost certain material monuments that greatly enriched the range of its material heritage. As an example, the ancient city of Chersonese of Tavria should be mentioned, that is on the list of UNESCO.

¹⁴ "Художні 'Радянські' Мозаїки: Врятувати Чи Дозволити Знищити?", March 26, 2024. <https://ratusha.lviv.ua/hudozhni-radyanski-mozayiky-vryatuvaty-chy-dozvolity-znyshhyty/>.

¹⁵ "Russia's War on Ukraine's Cultural Heritage | Think Tank | European Parliament", April 21, 2022. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA\(2022\)729377](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2022)729377).

The Crimean land, with a large number of cultural monuments and historical reserves, has turned into a territory of politically motivated actions, such as unauthorized archaeological excavations and the destruction of authentic monuments under the guise of “conservation works”. The annexation itself and military intervention caused major conflicts over what belonged and how it should be protected. An example is the scandal regarding the Crimean “Scythian gold”, which turned into a real legal dispute connected with its acquisition.¹⁶

Although the violent landscape of political instability and armed conflict, the resistance of Ukraine’s cultural institutions and the efforts of the DRM as well as the Ukrainian Blue Shield Committee play a significant role in saving the country’s cultural patrimony. The main goal of those organizations is to preserve cultural values from sabotage, looting and destruction.¹⁷

The full-scale invasion that took place in 2022 greatly disturbed the preservation of cultural heritage in Ukraine. The scale of the destruction expanded significantly as the number of cultural sites that were damaged or completely destroyed. Indeed, it was a turning point for Ukrainian culture, since it had never been in greater danger since 1991. The classification of material heritage covers several separate categories. First,

¹⁶ Громадський Простір. “Культурна Спадщина Під Впливом Збройного Конфлікту в Україні: Виклики Та Відповіді”, Мау 19, 2020. <https://www.prostir.ua/?news=kulturna-spadschyna-pid-vplyvom-zbrojnoho-konfliktu-v-ukrajini-vykyky-ta-vidpovidi>.

¹⁷ UNDP. “Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery in Ukraine”, n.d. <https://www.undp.org/ukraine/projects/strengthening-disaster-risk-reduction-and-recovery-ukraine>.

there are cultural heritage sites that, despite the lack of legal monument status, are still significant as historical structures. Secondly, sightseeing attractions that are officially recognized for their cultural importance. Lastly, cultural and educational institutions, such as music or art schools, houses of culture, and university buildings, play pivotal roles in shaping the cultural and educational landscape.¹⁸ Russian Federation, in the period between February 24th, 2022, and February 25th, 2024, caused destruction or damage to 945 cultural heritage sites. More than 128 of them are state value monuments, and 742 are of regional ones. Additionally, 75 objects are newly discovered cultural heritage.¹⁹ The destruction of cultural heritage can be categorized into various dimensions. Strategic destruction, perpetrated by various types of arms, represents only one facet of this phenomenon. Another one is creation of the new monuments and cultural locations within the occupied lands. The destruction itself has a following common denominator: landmarks and stores of Ukraine's heritage and statehood are destroyed selectively.

For example, museums and memorials honoring figures such as Taras Shevchenko, a symbol of Ukrainian national consciousness, and commemorating the traumas inflicted

¹⁸ Суспільне. “Як Воєнні Злочини Руйнують Культурну Спадщину України – Коментує Катерина Чуєва.” Суспільне | Новини, July 6, 2022. <https://suspilne.media/culture/256901-ak-voenni-zlocini-rujnuut-kulturnu-spadsinu-ukraini-komentue-katerina-cueva/>.

¹⁹ Ukrinform, and Ukrinform. “В Україні Через Російську Агресію Пошкоджені Або Зруйновані 945 Пам’яток Культурної Спадщини”, March 5, 2024. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-culture/3835895-v-ukraini-cerez-rosijsku-agresiu-poskodzeni-abo-zrujnovani-945-pamatok-kulturnoi-spadsini.html>.

by Soviet rule and the Holocaust are subject to systematic attacks.²⁰ On the other hand, sites with narratives favorable to Russian historical perspectives, like those associated with Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, are visibly preserved. This selective destruction is also illustrated by the consistent targeting of memorials dedicated to the Holodomor, which Russia diminishes as a non-specific tragedy, thereby denying its recognition as a genocide specifically against Ukrainians.²¹ Besides, the destruction of a regional archive, purported to house Soviet-era secret police documents, also belongs to this strategy.

Moreover, due to the aggravation of Russian invasion threat, UNESCO has enhanced its efforts to protect Ukraine's cultural heritage. The first feature that was used for this is related to the use of the Blue Shield emblem, which serves as a sign that allows the identification of cultural objects and monuments. In addition, Ernesto Ottone, Assistant Director-General for Culture at UNESCO, critically emphasizes that "humanity's heritage is in danger".²² Only between February 24 and April 1, 2022, the records registered that war in

²⁰ NEMO – The Network of European Museum Organisations. "Two National Museums in Kyiv Damaged by Russian Missiles", n.d. <https://www.ne-mo.org/news-events/article/two-national-museums-in-kyiv-damaged-by-russian-missiles>.

²¹ Naylor, Aliide. "Kremlin's War on History Targets Holodomor Remembrance." CEPA, December 12, 2023. <https://cepa.org/article/kremlins-war-on-history-targets-holodomor-remembrance/>.

²² Jazeera, Al. "Dozens of Ukrainian Cultural Sites Damaged in Russian Invasion." Al Jazeera, April 1, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/1/ukrainian-cultural-sites-heritage-damaged-russian-invasion-unesco>.

Ukraine have already damaged 29 religious sites, 16 buildings of historical value, 4 museums, and 4 monuments in total, with the main concentration of destruction in the Kharkiv region due to military capture.²³ The organization's negotiations with Russian representatives to safeguard the sites and remind Russia of its obligations arising from the international conventions prove the immense sacrifice needed to preserve the irreplaceable sites. Although Russia reaffirms its commitment to protecting cultural monuments, the ongoing destruction raises questions about the approach by which international norms can protect them in times of war.

Russian troops did not limit themselves only to the destruction of cultural treasures, because their strategy also includes looting. Illustrative of this was the looting of Mariupol's art museum, from which works by eminent artists like Arkhip Kuindzhi and Ivan Aivazovsky were pilfered. Furthermore, over ten thousand exhibits were illegally taken from Kher-son's art museum, with the occupying administration itself acknowledging the act while framing it as a "preservation" of cultural riches. Notably, stolen pieces, such as those by Shishkin, Aivazovsky, and Kuindzhi, were relocated to the Simferopol museum, underscoring a wider impulse of cultural appropriation. Experts say the trend reflects an underlying ethos that no monuments remain impartial to Russia, as evidenced by the deliberate destruction of the "Milan" mural in Mariupol, symbolizing the tragic fallout from past bombardments. Such actions symbolize not only Russian domination, but also previous historical precedents in which invaders rework the

²³ *Ibid.*

cultural environment according to heroic narratives of victory and domination.²⁴

This applies to the recently erected monuments to the so-called “Defenders of Donbas” in the city of the same name, as well as to the long-forgotten metallurgists in Alchevsk under actual Russian occupation and influence.²⁵ Despite the alleged innocence, the Russian Military Historical Society is now being involved in the construction of monuments on the occupied territory, including the “Unhealed Wound of Donbass” project. While other monuments are commissioned by federal ministries, the RMHS is also used as a proxy to pressure private donors to fund a symbolic “debt” to the past. It is also worth noting that such projects are also financed and initiated by Russian politicians. Their main goal is to legitimize actions, namely to convince society of the correctness of political decisions.

Unveiling the Challenges: Cultural Heritage Production amidst the War in Ukraine

In Ukraine, one of the biggest challenges to cultural heritage is related to financial restrictions. The national budget allocation

²⁴ Іщенко, Вікторія. “Боротьба з Ідентичністю. Як Росія Знищує Українські Пам’ятники в Окупації Та Що Створює Замість Них”, March 21, 2024. <https://novosti.dn.ua/article/8824-borotba-z-identychnistyu-yak-rosiya-znyshhuye-ukrayinski-pam-yatnyku-v-okupatsiyi-ta-shho-stvoryuye>.

²⁵ “В Донецке Установили Монумент «Шахтерам – Защитникам Донбасса» – Новости”, n.d. <https://rvio.histrf.ru/activities/news/v-donecke-ustanovili-monument-shahteram-zashitnikam-donbassa>.

is insufficient, partly because of the ongoing militarization.²⁶ Currently, the security of the Ukrainian people is a top priority for the Ukrainian government. Therefore, there is limited space for allocating a significant amount of resources to cultural needs during the peak of the war. The government's focus on physical heritage protection limits funding for greater cultural initiatives. Most costs for production, restoration, and reconstruction rely on private or external funding. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in September approved the draft State Budget of Ukraine for 2024, and the document was later submitted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Compared to the 2023 budget, the spending on culture and media has been increased by UAH 2.3 billion.²⁷ Even if this amount of finances seems huge, it is still not enough for the sufficient heritage protection or production. According to UNESCO, there is a pressing need for nearly \$9 billion to rebuild Ukraine's cultural sites, despite the financial hurdles the country must overcome.²⁸ This statement demonstrates a huge gap between

²⁶ Ukrinform, and Ukrinform. “«Розумна Мілітаризація» України: Як Стримувати Ворога Після Перемоги”, October 29, 2022. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3603478-rozumna-militarizacia-ukraina-mae-svij-dosvid-organizacii-oboroni-ale-pisla-peremogi-gotova-skoristatisa-j-cuzim.html>. (accessed 14.02.2024).

²⁷ Kitsoft. “Кабінет Міністрів України – Уряд Заклав у Держбюджет На 2024 Рік 10,7 Млрд Грн На Сферу Культури Та Медіа”, n.d. (accessed 15.02.2024) <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/uriad-zaklav-u-derzhbiudzheth-na-2024-rik-107-mlrd-hrn-na-sferu-kultury-ta-media>.

²⁸ Ap. “Ukraine Needs Nearly \$9 Billion To Rebuild Its Cultural Sites, Tourism Industry, UNESCO Says.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, February 14, 2024. <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-9-billion-rebuild-cultural-tourism-unesco-russia/32818272.html>. (accessed 15.02.2024).

allocated finances for this year and the amount of money needed for the reconstruction.

Another challenge in the creation of cultural heritage arises from the significant displacement of people. As of February 15, 2024, the UNHCR has recorded 6,004,047 refugees from Ukraine across Europe.²⁹ It means that all these individuals are currently displaced from their homes, hometowns, and country. Unfortunately, they lack physical access to the material cultural heritage in Ukraine, and the enhancement of their sense of belonging to society cannot be adequately pursued due to their literal absence in the community. Despite Ukrainian people's efforts to gather together in their current places of residence, it proves insufficient for the comprehensive development of their culture. This issue has long-term implications, considering that not all individuals may return to Ukraine once the war is over. Besides, there is an enduring impact on the cities themselves due to internal migration within Ukraine. Even regional displacement has a great impact on human cultural consciousness, which can later lead to the erasure of certain regional customs or traditions.

Due to the stringent mobilization efforts in Ukraine, it is evident that there is a shortage of people or specialists available to handle the technical aspects associated with the production and protection of cultural heritage in the country.³⁰ While

²⁹ "CReAM: Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration – Ukraine Crisis", n.d. <https://cream-migration.org/ukraine-detail.htm?article=3573>.

³⁰ "Mobilization and Demobilization in Ukraine: What Changes Does the Government Propose in the New Draft Law?", n.d. <https://visitukraine.today/blog/3125/mobilization-and-demobilization-in->

there are undoubtedly skilled professionals, such as professors and others, actively involved in Ukraine's cultural sphere, their numbers are relatively low, and their activities are limited by the challenging conditions of war. Nevertheless, Ukraine has gained increased international recognition over the past two years, and its cultural development has accelerated despite the ongoing war and associated challenges.

According to the Protocol I of the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, it is forbidden to target monuments during war.³¹ Russia, however, is still actively engaged in the destruction of the state's cultural sites. Therefore, in this case, international law is insufficiently effective and does not have a significant impact on the decisions of the Russian side of the conflict. Fortunately, Ukraine is receiving strong international support, leading to innovative solutions to address this issue. One such solution involves the digitalization of the cultural sphere. International volunteers are collaborating to archive digital content related to Ukrainian cultural heritage, safeguarding it from potential destruction caused by the invasion. The Internet Archive is actively supporting preservation endeavors, including the Saving Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Online (SUCHO) initiative, launched on March 1, 2022.³² UNESCO, in this case, has also played a pivotal role

ukraine-what-changes-does-the-government-propose-in-the-new-draft-law#google_vignette.

³¹ Hausler, Drazewska. "How does international law protect Ukrainian cultural heritage in war? Is it protected differently than other civilian objects?" British Institute of International and Comparative Law.

³² "About SUCHO | SUCHO", n.d. <https://www.sucho.org/about>.

in supporting Ukraine, marking key historic monuments and sites across the country with the emblem of the 1954 Hague Convention, an internationally recognized symbol for the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflicts.³³ Additionally, UNESCO is collaborating with the country's museum directors to coordinate conservation efforts, ensuring the protection of collections and monitoring potential damage to cultural sites using satellite imaging.

Conclusion

The Russian-Ukrainian war has brought a new perspective on the heritage during the war, stressing its importance and powerfulness. This research describes a wide range of cultural heritage with special emphasis on physical objects and general theory related to its intangible manifestations. Material heritage objects, such as monuments and museums, have both suffered and become key battlegrounds where people fight to preserve their memory and identity despite distorted histories or cultural propaganda. The decision-making process regarding the strategic destruction and preservation is complex, since it evokes internal disagreements and dilemmas within the society.

³³ Hickley, Catherine. "Unesco 'gravely Concerned' about Damage to Ukrainian Cultural Heritage." *The Art Newspaper – International art news and events*, March 4, 2022 <https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2022/03/04/unesco-gravely-concerned-about-damage-to-ukrainian-cultural-heritage>. (accessed 15.02.2024).

The research reveals that the intentional and accidental damage to cultural heritage has led to a major reevaluation of historical narratives, turning these assets into strategic tools in the geopolitical arena. Besides, it explores how heritage intersects with propaganda and memory politics are reshaping national myths and challenging the preservation of collective memory amidst the chaos of war. In conclusion, the chapter has confirmed that the process of safeguarding and production of the heritage among the war is much more complicated than it appears, but still is of a highest importance for the state in the sphere of cultural responsibility. The findings suggest a distinctive approach to heritage conservation that recognizes the multifaceted nature of heritage caught in the crossfire of history and contemporary conflicts. It also contributes to the broader discourse on cultural memory and identity, highlighting the urgent need for policies that could deal with the complexities of preserving heritage in times of harsh war.

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The Holocaust in Ukraine's Educational Policy. An Attempt to Analyse Educational Discourse from the Perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis

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Abstract

The subject of the speech is a discourseological study conducted by the authors in December this year. A multi-level analysis of the discourse relating to the Holocaust and reproduced within the framework of Ukrainian educational policy was prepared by using the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (especially based on the assumptions of Historical Discourse Analysis according to Ruth Wodak and some linguistic approaches). The latest (modified after the outbreak

of the war) Ukrainian core curriculum and the content of the most popular school textbooks made available by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (Міністерство освіти і науки України) were subjected to a detailed analysis. The analysis was intended to answer questions about how the Holocaust is talked about in Ukrainian educational policy today at the level of ministerial assumptions and the content of school textbooks. As part of the context, the chapter also mentions some side issues related to the general reception of the difficult heritage of the Holocaust in the so-called post-Soviet countries. This topic seems important because – as a rule – the participation of Ukrainians in the Holocaust is still the subject of numerous controversies (approximately 1.5 million Jews lost their lives there), and the Ukrainian authorities themselves are often accused of “silence” on the topic. The research conducted by the authors serves to critically verify these assumptions and is also intended to indicate how the Ukrainian memory policy is changing today, which may serve to properly commemorate the partially uncommemorated heritage.

Keywords: Holocaust education, Ukraine, educational discourse, heritage, Critical Discourse Analysis

The fundamental starting point for the discourse on the Holocaust in educational policy is based on three essential assumptions. The first of them is based on the strong conviction of the authors of the work regarding the rudimentarily discursive nature of the world around us.¹ The second assumption

¹ *Vide e.g.:* Waldemar Czachur, “Dyskursywny obraz świata. Kilka refleksji”, *Tekst i Dyskurs = Text und Diskurs*, no. 4 (2011): 87.

concerns the issue of education itself, in which the authors of these words – following Michael Apple – see a force capable not only of facilitating the young individual’s realisation of current existential needs by equipping them with necessary tools but also enabling real social change on a broad scale, relating to fundamental paradigms of thought.² The third underlying conviction in these considerations relates to the specific status of the Holocaust itself, which should be perceived as an event *sui generis*, hence essential even to this day insofar as it “constantly throws light on, widens, and deepens (our) view of countless other things”.³

With these three assumptions as a foundation, the significance of research on the educational discourse about the Holocaust is easily understood. This is a topic of extraordinary importance for the contemporary world that must not be silenced in education. How the Holocaust is discussed in teaching, according to the theory of the discursive image of the world, will undoubtedly impact the worldview of the beneficiaries of the education system, that is, all of us. Therefore, the ongoing debates about the place of the Holocaust in historical education in many European countries should not be surprising. Post-Soviet countries, in particular, have developed their own methods of discussing (or not discussing) the Holocaust in education, which is now the subject of intense reflection. Ukraine, in this context, is of particular interest. According to various estimates, during

² Michael Apple, *Can education change society?* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 4.

³ Richard Peters, *Ethnics and Education* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 159.

World War II, up to 1.6 million local Jews lost their lives,⁴ making Ukraine as a country a significant bearer of memory of the Jewish tragedy. At the same time, in recent years, various voices have been raised suggesting that Ukraine might be attempting to silence the genocide of Jews, with the Holocaust becoming a space of collective forgetting.⁵

Therefore, at this particular moment, when Ukraine has formally embarked on the path of accession to the European Union, it is worthwhile to thoroughly examine how the issue of the Holocaust is addressed in the Ukrainian education system. Hence, the subject of these considerations becomes the analysis of the Holocaust discourse, what and how is said on the topic in Ukrainian textbooks and curricula for the subjects *History of Ukraine* and *World History*. The authors of the study adopted a methodological approach characteristic of critical discourse analysis, but aware of the limitations of this technique, they also employed detailed methods of linguistic text analysis. Thanks to this, they were able to create a comprehensive analysis, allowing the authors to determine what Ukrainian students learn about the Holocaust, what type of discourse on the Holocaust is being reproduced for them, and critically, what is missing or deliberately omitted in this discourse. The content of the study follows a three-step structure: firstly, the

⁴ Alexander Kruglov, "Jewish Losses in Ukraine 1941–1944" in *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization*, ed. Ray Brandon, Wendy Lower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 273.

⁵ In Polish science, such a thesis was put forward by, among others, E. Prus in his study titled *Holocaust po banderowsku*; cf.: Edward Prus, *Holocaust po banderowsku* (Wrocław: Nortom, 2001).

concept of discourse and its analysis were introduced in relation to the research methods which were used. Subsequently, the specifics of the educational discourse on the Holocaust were characterised, taking into account post-Soviet countries. Finally, a direct analysis of source material was conducted, i.e., Ukrainian curricula and eleven school textbooks.

Discourse and its analysis

Michel Foucault perceived discourse as a specific way of connecting words and reality, existing in that reality in a particular and somewhat tangible manner. Accepting the existence of discourse as a social fact, according to the philosopher, enabled society to organise social knowledge, create new meanings, and constitute social structures.⁶ This perspective aligns with the framework of constructivist thought, based on the belief that the examined “subjects are immersed in social structures” and social reality is not “objective or subjective but intersubjective, created by meanings and beliefs shared by individuals”⁷

Teun A. van Dijk, currently one of the most influential discourse researchers, observes that discourse is essentially

⁶ Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 135–140.

⁷ Jacek Czaputowicz, “Wprowadzenie. Potencjał konstruktywizmu w wyjaśnieniu integracji europejskiej” in *Zastosowanie konstruktywizmu w studiach europejskich*, *idem* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2016), 11–12.

“sets of ideas that provide the threads from which ideologies are woven”.⁸ Discourse involves the transmission of ideas through language in specific social realities, and the phenomenon itself has a procedural and recursive character.⁹ Its procedural and recursive nature means that these three elements continually interact with each other and should be studied in such a way. In research practice, one should be aware of these dependencies and conduct discourse analysis not only to describe observed linguistic phenomena but also to constantly interpret them in the context of the reproduced ideas and their impact on society.

For a context, Paul Ricoeur’s characterisation of discourse is also worth citing, noting four features of discourse. Firstly, discourse always has an eventful nature, progressing over time as a certain process. Discourse is also individualised – it has its authors and recipients, and their identity is an important element of further analysis. According to Ricoeur, discourse is subject to external conditioning, existing in a specific place and time, referring to the given conditions. Finally, the language of discourse has any significance only when it becomes a space for communication and carries specific content.¹⁰ Keeping in mind the above reflections, or the purposes of this work, discourse is considered a social fact, a specific integration

⁸ *Vide*: Cris Shore, Susan Wright, “Policy. A new field of anthropology” in *Anthropology of Policy. Critical perspectives on governance and power*, *eidem* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 18.

⁹ ed. Teun van Dijk, *Dyskurs jako struktura i proces*, trans. Grzegorz Grochowski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), 44.

¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *Język, tekst, interpretacja. Wybór pism*, (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1989), 91.

of language and ideas aimed at the reproduction of these ideas, with its sender and receiver, existing in specific realities, being a variable and progressive process, and above all, a carrier of content.

The method of discourse analysis that has been used as the methodological foundation for this work is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The popularity of this method results from its ability to easily draw from the achievements of other methods and schools according to the researcher's individual plan. The "critical" aspect of this method, on the other hand, involves the analyst's active engagement with the subject of analysis and allows, to some extent, the utilisation of their subjective perspective. One of the most prominent researchers within CDA, R. Wodak, explicitly emphasises that the role of critical analysis is the "demystification of discourses through deciphering ideologies",¹¹ especially within her innovative approach to studying discourses from a historical perspective.¹²

All of this makes Critical Discourse Analysis – focused on issues of ideology, history, power, and domination – a very convenient research tool, especially when examining discourses strongly engaged in political and social matters. These are discourses that evoke emotions and may tempt to conceal specific ideologies within them. Critical Discourse Analysis allows

¹¹ Ruth Wodak, "Critical Linguistic and Critical Discourse Analysis" in *Discursive Pragmatics*, ed. Jan Zienkowski, Jan-Ola Östman, Jef Verschueren (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011), 52.

¹² ed. Marek Czyżewski and others, *Analiza dyskursu publicznego. Przegląd metod i perspektyw badawczych* (Warsaw: Sedno, 2017), 180.

for the creation of an original analysis in this matter, deciphering these ideologies by focusing on elements defined by the author, without the need for a holistic examination of the discourse. However, it is essential to acknowledge certain criticisms formulated against CDA, particularly regarding the lack of objectivity and the indeterminacy of specific analysis methods.¹³ This analysis incorporates numerous specific examples (quotes from the examined sources) in its relevant section and is also based on elements of linguistic and quantitative research.

The specificity of the educational discourse on the Holocaust in the Ukraine

The educational discourse, according to Teresa Hejnicka-Bezwińska, can be understood as the connection between statements about education itself, the specific language used in schools, and the general exchange of communications in education.¹⁴ In comparison with the latest social processes – the development of new media, the emergence of hybrid cultural identities, or changes in socio-economic structure – what, how, and to whom one speaks in school, now freed from the previous dominance of the nation-state, becomes particularly

¹³ Monika Maria Brzezińska, Piotr Burgoński, Michał Gierycz, *Analiza dyskursu politycznego. Teorie, zastosowanie, granice naukowości* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo UKSW, 2018), 54.

¹⁴ Teresa Hejnicka-Bezwińska, *Pedagogika ogólna* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2008), 236–239.

important and meaningful.¹⁵ This is especially true when, following Foucault and Jacques Derrida, one acknowledges the complete lack of neutrality in discourse, which always serves the construction, regulation, and control of knowledge.¹⁶

When considering the discourse on the Holocaust in education, as identified by Aleksandra Boroń, two trends can be distinguished: universal and particular.¹⁷ Within the universal trend, the Holocaust is often discussed as a historical fact, similar to hundreds of other events. The universal discourse typically relies on presenting specific historical facts and has a highly structured nature, with political reflection prevailing over socio-cultural considerations.¹⁸ In the particular trend, on the other hand, the distinctiveness of the Holocaust from other genocides is emphasised, highlighting its unimaginable scale, bureaucratic efficiency, and absolutely traumatic form.¹⁹ The central focus is on the Jews, considering the difficult history of this ethnic group in two fundamental forms: metaphysical (contemplation on the nature of suffering and evil) and national-theological (reflection on divine national mission and its repercussions).²⁰

¹⁵ Aleksandra Boroń, *Pedagogika (p) o Holokauście. Pamięć. Tożsamość. Edukacja* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2013), 26–27.

¹⁶ Allan Luke, “Theory and Practice in Critical Discourse Analysis” in *International Encyclopedia of Sociology of Education*, ed. Larry Saha, accessed February 5, 2024, <https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/ed270/Luke/SAHA6.html>.

¹⁷ Boroń, *Pedagogika*, 43.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 45–46.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ Norman Lamm, *The Face of God: Thoughts on the Holocaust* (New York: Yeshiva University Department of Holocaust Studies, 1986), 3.

It is worth trying to define the general nature of the discourse on the Holocaust in education in the so-called post-Soviet countries, fundamentally marked by a culture of non-remembrance reproduced from the 1940s to the 1980s through the Soviet education system. In Soviet realities, the Holocaust was a process entirely condemned to oblivion; the topic was either omitted or falsified.²¹ According to Agnieszka Matusiak, several reasons contribute to such a state of affairs, including the reduction of reflections on World War II to the glorification of the Great Patriotic War myth, the necessity to create a new type of identity, monolithic and excluding other ethnicities, the desire to conceal Stalinist purges against Jews, and an attempt to hide the fact of collaboration by some residents of the USSR with the Nazis.²²

In 1991, independent Ukraine fully inherited this cultural legacy of silence on the Holocaust topic. In the post-Soviet states, the historical policy regarding the Holocaust shifted from “normative non-remembrance” to “constitutive forgetting for the creation of a new identity”, a process characteristic of the so-called post-Soviet states.²³ In the case of Ukraine, not even the fact that the first president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, apologised on behalf of the Ukrainian

²¹ Agata Czajkowska, “Społeczno-polityczny kontekst edukacji o Holokauście w poradzieckiej Rosji”, *Teraźniejszość – Człowiek – Edukacja* 23, no. 2(90) (2021): 12.

²² Agnieszka Matusiak, “Holokaust: rewitalizacja ukraińskiej pamięci? W osiemdziesiątą rocznicę wydarzeń w Babim Jarze”, *Judaica Russica*, no. 2(7) (2021): 10–11.

²³ Paul Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting”, *Memory Studies*, no. 1 (2008): 62–64.

people to the Jewish people for the actions of Ukrainian collaborators involved in the Holocaust during his speech in the Knesset in 1993, changed this.²⁴

According to Katarzyna Jędraszczyk, in the Ukrainian wartime discourse, two predominant trends emerged.²⁵ The first, identified by researcher as a nationalist or simply Ukrainian trend, is characterised by an ethnocentric and nativist narrative. This narrative focuses on describing the suffering Ukrainians experienced at the hands of the occupiers. The second model, the so-called post-Soviet model, reproduces the earlier discourse, speaking of the general suffering of Slavs at the hands of the Nazis and the heroism of Ukrainians fighting in the ranks of the Red Army. What connects both models is the fact that neither of them programmatically considers the fate of minorities, presenting a collective perspective. The fate of Jews remains insignificant in both cases, subjected to what Ricoeur referred to as “memory filtering”.²⁶

The processes that unfolded in the subsequent years of independent Ukraine’s existence led to the emergence of other narrative strategies regarding the Holocaust. This occurred because Ukrainian historiography managed to create stable response to accusations of Ukrainians’ involvement in the murder of Jews: it was acknowledged that such situations

²⁴ “Журнал «Україна – Ізраїль»: нарис історії народження і смерті, через 25 років”, ОлександрБураковський, accessed February 5, 2024, <https://uamoderna.com/shafka-dok/journal-ukraine-izrael>.

²⁵ Katarzyna Jędraszczyk, “Modele pamięci o Holokauście na Ukrainie w kontekście marginalności i marginalizacji dyskursów pamięci”, *Politeja* 70, no. 1 (2021): 44–45.

²⁶ *Vide*: Jacek Żakowski, *Rewanż pamięci* (Warsaw: Sic!, 2002), 47.

occurred, but the scale of these events was ignored. Additionally, they were justified by antipathy towards Jews represented as supporters of Bolshevism and co-responsible for the Holodomor (Great Famine).²⁷ Anatoly Podolsky distinguished three memory models of the Holocaust that could potentially be realised in such political and social conditions in Ukraine. The first model involves a return to the Soviet narrative, where Jews were seen as victims of the Nazis and Ukrainian nationalists. The second model is nationalist in its character: within this framework, Jews were victims of Nazi Germany, and one should remember their sacrifice and emphasize the contributions of Ukrainians in saving Jewish people. The third model perceives the Holocaust as part of the history of the European continent, worthy of exploration from a broader, pan-European perspective.²⁸ As evident, each of these models that could currently emerge in Ukrainian education becomes a carrier of a specific ideology, not exempt from its constraints.

Sources: textbooks and core curriculum.

Method of analysis

The main source subjected to detailed analysis in this study was eleven Ukrainian textbooks designed for 10th-grade students, addressing the topics related to World War II

²⁷ Jędraszczyk, *Modele*, 48–49.

²⁸ Анатолий Подольский, “Сучасна історія як інструмент політичних маніпуляцій (наприклад вивчення історії Голокосту)”, *Науковий вісник* 90, no. 4 (2017): 209.

most comprehensively and specifically in the Ukrainian education system. For the analysis, six textbooks for the subject *History of Ukraine* and five for the subject *History of the World* were selected. The analysed textbooks were sourced from the official website of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, where their full texts were made available after the outbreak of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war. These textbooks have been officially approved for use in Ukrainian mainstream schools:

Subject	Designation	Author(s)	Title	The place and date of publication
History of Ukraine	[U1]	Н.М. Сорочинська, О.О. Гісем, Історія	<i>України. Рівень Стандарту. Підручник для 10 класу закладів загальної середньої освіти</i>	Ternopil 2018.
	[U2]	О.К. Струкевич	<i>Історія України 10</i>	Kyiv 2018.
	[U3]	В.С. Власов, С.В. Кульчицький	<i>Історія України (профільний рівень): підручник для 10 класу закладів загальної середньої освіти</i>	Kyiv 2018.
	[U4]	В.С. Власов, С.В. Кульчицький	<i>Історія України (стандартний рівень): підручник для 10 класу закладів загальної середньої освіти</i>	Kyiv 2018.
	[U5]	О.В. Гісем, О.О. Мартинюк	<i>Історія України 10. Рівень Стандарту</i>	Kharkiv 2018
	[U6]	О.І. Пометун, Н.М. Гупан	<i>Історія України 10. (Рівень стандарту)</i>	Kyiv 2018.
History of the World	[W1]	О.В. Гісем, О.О. Мартинюк	<i>Всесвітня історія. Профільний рівень. Підручник для 10 класу</i>	Kharkiv 2018
	[W2]	О.В. Гісем, О.О. Мартинюк	<i>Всесвітня історія. Рівень Стандарту. Підручник для 10 класу</i>	Kharkiv 2018
	[W3]	Н.М. Сорочинська, О.О. Гісем	<i>Всесвітня історія. Рівень Стандарту</i>	Ternopil 2018
	[W4]	П. Полянський	<i>Всесвітня Історія (Рівень Стандарту). Підручник Для 10 Класу Закладів Загальної Середньої Освіти</i>	Kyiv 2018.
	[W5]	І.Я. Щупак	<i>Всесвітня Історія. Рівень Стандарту</i>	Kyiv 2018

Table 1. *List of analysed textbooks.*

Source: own compilation

For the purposes of the study, the content of the curriculum for both history subjects was also analysed. The aim of this action was primarily to determine what knowledge about the Holocaust Ukrainian students are formally expected to acquire according to the official requirements of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. This information can be found in the document *History of Ukraine. History of the World. 6–11 terms. Teaching program for secondary comprehensive schools*.²⁹

In accordance with the provisions contained in the curriculum for the subject *History of Ukraine* students will be able to understand the concepts of: war crimes, Holocaust, Nazi New Order, Righteous Among the Nations or the Black Book of Soviet Jewry or Babi Yar.³⁰ In the section dedicated to practical educational projects, the curriculum recommends, among other things, implementing the project “The World of Childhood in Ukrainian Literature about the Holocaust” with students. As an example of written assignments, it suggests the topic “Babi Yar in Kyiv as a symbol of the Holocaust and other tragedies”.³¹

The *History of the World* course is largely based on the same topics, but it also pays close attention to issues of genocide with examples like Holodomor, Holocaust, extermination of the Roma, deportation of the Crimean Tatars, genocide

²⁹ Міністерство освіти і науки України, *Історія України. Всесвітня Історія. 6–11 Класи. Навчальна програма для закладів загальної середньої освіти. (наказ Міністерства освіти і науки України від 03 серпня 2022 року № 698).*

³⁰ *Ibidem*, 81.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 82.

crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian War.³² It also suggests explaining to students the concept of anti-Semitism in the context of pre-war phenomena³³.

The analysis of the curriculum itself may lead to interesting conclusions from the perspective of critical discourse analysis: on the one hand, it seems that the curriculum requires students to have knowledge that could reasonably be expected. At the same time there are noticeable gaps in these requirements – relatively little attention is paid in the ministerial recommendations to the overall European genesis of the Holocaust and pre-war manifestations of anti-Semitism, and there are no references to the existence of anti-Semitism in Ukraine (whether during the imperial or Soviet periods). The researcher may also observe a somewhat troubling strategy of “diluting” the problem by comparing the Holocaust in a section of the curriculum to other tragedies Holodomor or pogroms of Armenians.

Despite the above observations, it is essential to remember that curricula are meant to serve as a formal basis that students and teachers utilise. Therefore, in the context of the analysis, the most interesting conclusions should arise from a critical examination of the content of the textbooks themselves. This analysis is purely authorial, although it occasionally draws on the methodology of multi-level linguistic discourse analysis (DIMEAN) by I.H. Warnke and J. Spitzmüller.³⁴ The analy-

³² *Ibidem*, 69.

³³ *Ibidem*, 64.

³⁴ Cf.: Ingo Warnke, Jürgen Spitzmüller, “Wielopoziomowalingwistyczna analiza dyskursu – DIMEAN”, trans. Waldemar Czachur, Kinga Zielińska, *Tekst i Dyskurs = Text und Diskurs*, no. 2 (2009): 123–147.

sis proceeds “from the general to the particular”, i.e., from the broadest determinants of content on a macro scale to the smallest and finest details. Firstly, the analysis examines what portion of the entire textbook is dedicated to the discourse on the Holocaust. Subsequently, it delves into how the Holocaust is defined, and finally, it analyses the so-called keywords, determining the semantic relations within specific semantic fields based on words particularly significant from the perspective of the Holocaust discourse. Special attention is paid to elements such as defining the genesis of the Holocaust, the linguistic portrayal of its victims and perpetrators, and the way the process itself is described. From a technical standpoint, the study was conducted using the MAXQDA program, enabling mixed qualitative-quantitative data analysis.

The place of Holocaust in Ukrainian textbooks

The topic of the Holocaust is addressed in each of the analysed textbooks. In the book from *History of Ukraine*, it is discussed in the sixth chapter (*Ukraine during World War II*). In the textbooks from *History of the World*, it is covered in the seventh chapter (*World War II*) and in earlier chapters in the context of emerging anti-Semitism. In the textbooks from *History of Ukraine*, the Holocaust is discussed in the context of reflections on the occupation regime in Ukraine: first, the system of oppression against the Ukrainian people as such is discussed, and then the Holocaust is pointed out as an example of another criminal activity of Nazi Germany. Usually, this topic concludes a subchapter, after which the forms

of resistance against the Nazi occupier are discussed. In the textbooks from *History of the World*, the Holocaust itself is discussed in the segment dedicated to the first years of Nazi occupation of Ukraine (1941–1942). The discussion typically begins with a general characterisation of the Nazi new order in the occupied territories, and after describing the Holocaust issue, the textbook authors usually move on to the description of the further stages of the war. In analysed sources Holocaust is treated only small part of a subchapter.

The theme alone of the Holocaust also occupies a relatively small space in relation to the overall volume of the textbooks. These relationships are presented in the table below, for which all words in the entire textbooks were counted, the number of words constituting chapters related to World War II, and the number of words making up sections dedicated to the Holocaust:

Subject	Textbook	Volume of the textbook [words]	Volume of the chapter concerning WWII [words]	The volume of content related to the Holocaust [words]	WWII to the whole [percent]	Holo-caust to WWII [percent]	Holo-caust to the whole [percent]
History of Ukraine	[U1]	79 417	21618	960	27,2%	4,4%	1,2%
	[U2]	85 333	24769	677	29%	2,7%	0,8%
	[U3]	102 759	22727	1045	22,1%	4,6%	1%
	[U4]	80 593	19645	648	24,4%	3,3%	0,8%
	[U5]	80 280	17692	380	22%	2,1%	0,5%
	[U6]	74 900	17026	678	22,7%	4%	0,9%
	Average	79 380,3	20579,5	731,3	24,6%	3,5%	0,9%
History of the world	[W1]	106121	23771	759	22,4%	3,2%	0,7%
	[W2]	57037	15618	798	27,4%	5,1%	1,4%
	[W3]	80444	21094	668	26,2%	3,2%	0,8%
	[W4]	86005	22513	327	26,2%	1,5%	0,4%
	[W5]	84902	14635	2880	17,2%	19,7%	3,4%
	Average	82901,8	19526,2	1086,4	23,9%	6,5%	1,3%

Table 2. *Percentage analysis of content.*

Source: own compilation

The average length of a textbook for the subject of *History of Ukraine* is just under 80,000 words. The chapter on World War II statistically constitutes about 24.6% of the entire textbook. The theme of the Holocaust is addressed on average over about 730 words, which represents slightly less than 1% of the entire textbook. Textbooks for *History of the World* provide slightly more information about the Holocaust: their average length is almost 83,000 words each, with chapters on World War II comprising about 23.9% of the overall content. They dedicate about 1,086 words, approximately 1.3% of the total content of each textbook, to the Holocaust during war-time and pre-war anti-Semitism.

Certainly, such a quantitative analysis of content may indicate that very little is said about the Holocaust in Ukrainian textbooks. At this level, the topic is evidently treated as marginal. Consequently, individual textbooks appear remarkably similar to each other (yet they are based on the same ministerial guidelines). An important element that opens this section of reflections in most textbooks becomes the definition of the Holocaust.

Definition of Holocaust

At the beginning, it should be noted that an explicitly expressed definition of the Holocaust is present in 10 out of 11 textbooks (usually in a visually marked form, such as frame). It is only missing in the textbook [W4], where the issue of the Holocaust seems to be generally marginalised.

In each of the definitions, the victims (Jews) and the time frame of the Holocaust are specified. Thanks to this, students

can easily understand not only what the Holocaust was (mass extermination) but also recognise the victims and the temporally limited nature. In most definitions, the etymology of the word is explained. However, only in one textbook [W5] does another specific term associated with the Holocaust appear (Shoah). It is worth noting that the term Shoah is much more popular in Anglophone and Jewish cultures than in other languages.

However, a clearly disturbing fact is that only in 5 out of 10 definitions, the perpetrators are identified explicitly (as Germans, Nazis or collaborators). In half of the definitions, such identification is lacking initially, although it eventually appears in each textbook. Only about every third definition describes the Holocaust as genocide; in others, terms like death or mass extermination are used, making it somewhat difficult to properly recognize the nature of this phenomenon. Similarly, only three definitions point to the ultimate nature of this process, mentioning the phrase “Final Solution to the Jewish Question”, and only three definitions explicitly state the scale of this phenomenon.

Therefore, it can be argued that some of the textbook definitions are clearly deficient: they do not specify the perpetrators, do not indicate the Holocaust as systematic genocide, omit the number of victims, do not emphasise the ultimate nature of this process. This is important because these definitions are usually presented in textbooks in a visually distinguished manner as knowledge that must be acquired. Therefore, it can be assumed that for at least some students, these highlighted definitions will be what they ultimately know about the Holocaust.

Inside the text: code words and semantic fields

The first step taken to analyse the text itself was its frequency analysis, which allows for a possibly objective insight into the nature of the discourse. To conduct such an analysis from textbook texts, all fragments related to the Holocaust were extracted, previously marked in the MAXQDA program with appropriate codes. Then, using the tools available in the program, a so-called frequency list was generated, indicating the frequency of occurrence of specific words in the analysed corpus. Taking into account the flexibility of the Ukrainian language, lemmatisation was performed beforehand, meaning the reduction of a given word to dictionary form (lemmas).³⁵ For the purposes of this study, only forms of certain parts of speech were included in the frequency list, omitting less relevant parts of speech such as prepositions or conjunctions. This way, a list of the 50 most frequently occurring words in this discourse was created:

³⁵ Ed. Kazimierz Polański, *Encyklopedia językoznawstwa ogólnego* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo, 1999), 234.

No	Word	Translation	Frequency	No	Word	Translation	Frequency
1.	Єврей	Jew	131	26.	другий	second	28
2.	бути	to be	129	27.	світовий	global	28
3.	нацист	Nazi	112	28.	млн	million	27
4.	Україна	Ukraine	96	29.	режим	regime	27
5.	єврейський	Jewish	82	30.	смерть	death	27
6.	населення	population	65	31.	весь	everything	26
7.	тиснути	oppress	54	32.	людина	human	26
8.	народ	nation	44	33.	перший	first	26
9.	гетто	ghetto	43	34.	право	law	26
10.	німецький	German	43	35.	окупаційний	occupational	25
11.	Голокост	Holocaust	42	36.	світ	world	24
12.	вони	they	40	37.	близько	near	23
13.	рік	year	40	38.	європа	Europe	22
14.	табір	camp	39	39.	життя	life	22
15.	війнути	to fight	38	40.	окупація	occupation	22
16.	знищення	destruction	37	41.	Праведник	Righteous	22
17.	стати	To become	37	42.	знищити	to destroy	20
18.	Бабин Яр	Babi Yar	36	43.	радянський	soviet	20
19.	один	one	35	44.	Гітлер	Hitler	19
20.	освітити	enlighten	34	45.	інститут	institute	19
21.	особа	person	33	46.	міністерство	ministry	19
22.	країна	country	31	47.	політика	politics	19
23.	інший	different	29	48.	влада	power	18
24.	масовий	mass	29	49.	зміст	meaning	18
25.	територія	territory	29	50.	наука	science	18

Table 3. Frequency list of analysed words.

Source: own compilation

The mentioned 50 lemmas occur a total of 1921 times in all the analysed texts, which means that the list above contains over 20% of all the words making up the sections of textbooks dedicated to the Holocaust. These can be treated as specific keywords. W. Pisarek claimed that the “significant status of individual code words results, according to the definition, from their significantly higher frequency in the text in which they are keywords than in reference texts and preferably in a set of texts recognized as a representation of the use of a given language, that is, in the national corpus of that language”.³⁶ Although Pisarek himself diversified his approach to keywords in his works and pointed out various ways of understanding this concept, it should still be acknowledged that their reliable analysis must be based on a comparison of the most frequently used words in a given text with the frequency list appropriate for the entire corpus of the contemporary language.³⁷ Such a comparison was made for the purposes of this study, juxtaposing the frequency list presented above with the reference list for the Ukrainian language.

This allowed determining which words in the textbooks are clearly more frequent than in the general language. One such word is *Jew/Євреї*, which is one of the most common, ranking only 2189th on the frequency list. Similarly, *nazi/нацист* (here 3rd place, in the general language at 16537th),

³⁶ Walery Pisarek, “Słowa ważne i ważniejsze”, *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 454, no. 3 (2016): 12.

³⁷ *Vide*: “Частотний словник української мови”, Володимир Влад, accessed February 5, 2024, <https://u-mova.blogspot.com/2013/09/blog-post.html?fbclid=IwAR20YIMGG9O3xIJ0KnIiADK5tV0643PWG1mta9Z3StqQLZF6OuzrywKbMXI>.

Ukraine/Україна (here 4th, there 159th) or *destruction/знищення* (here 16th, there 3855th) have higher frequencies. Of course, specialized vocabulary also stands out in terms of frequency (*Ghetto/Гетто, Holocaust/Голокост, Hitler/Гітлер, Babi Yar/Бабин Яр, Righteous/Праведник*). It's also worth noting the range of verbs, with high frequencies for words such as *to oppress/тиснути* (here 7th, there 5914th), *to fight/війнути* (here 15th, there 6705th) or *to destroy/знищити* (here 44th, there 1172nd).

Thanks to such an analysis, one can objectively determine the character of the discourse and the reproduced semantic fields. Above all, it must be recognised that the Holocaust in Ukrainian textbooks is clearly linked to the perspective of the Jewish people (the word *Jew* is one of the most common in the text), and the Nazis are considered responsible for the extermination of the Jews. In this discourse an ethnocentric perspective dominates (the word *Ukraine* has high frequency, and the term *occupation* is also common, referring more to the Ukrainian nation as a whole), although concepts related to the global perspective are also present. Overall, the vocabulary associated with struggle or suffering is particularly popular in this discourse, which seems appropriate for this type of narrative. It is also noteworthy that expressions related to the massacre at Babi Yar are highly frequent, although the absence of words directly related to other places of execution (although generally mentioning ghettos and camps) draws attention. Similarly, there is a lack of words related to the functioning of the Holocaust system. Such an analysis serves as a preliminary step, determining directions for further research using qualitative analysis and text analysis methods.

Reasons and process of Holocaust, the image of the victims and perpetrators

For what is particularly important in the discussion of the Holocaust itself, one can consider the issue of its causes and sources: both from a political and socio-cultural perspective. In this regard, Ukrainian textbooks present a rather limited scope of information. In the *History of Ukraine* textbook, the Holocaust is portrayed as a problem that came “from nowhere”, suddenly appearing in 1941 with the beginning of the German occupation of Ukraine:

The Nazi “New Order” envisaged a special racial policy, with Jews, Roma (Gypsies), and Slavic peoples becoming its victims. In Ukraine, hundreds of camps and ghettos were created for the isolation and further destruction of the Jewish and other populations. [U4, p. 224].

What is essential is that only half of the textbooks mention in any way pre-war anti-Semitism, and that only in relation to pogroms organised by the Red Army.

History of the World's textbooks primarily focus on indicating the political path to the Holocaust (anti-Semitism, Nuremberg Laws or Kristallnacht), although none of them mentions, for example, the Wannsee Conference. Only 2 out of 5 textbooks address the topic of manifestations of anti-Semitism in other countries (the USSR and France), and only one textbook attempt to outline the cultural and social background behind the emergence of anti-Semitism in the Third Reich. In other cases, this phenomenon is presented as

emerging from nowhere and being only one of the political concepts of the Nazis:

In the socio-political life of the Third Reich, violence prevailed. Before the beginning of 1935, 4.2 thousand opponents of Nazism were killed, and 515 thousand people were imprisoned. Hundreds of thousands of Germans emigrated. The official policy of Germany, where approximately 500 thousand people of Jewish nationality lived by the beginning of 1933, became anti-Semitic. [W1, p. 77]

The course of the Holocaust is described relatively similarly in each of the textbooks on the *History of Ukraine*. At the beginning of the segment dedicated to the Holocaust, the authors explain the concept itself, and then provide one example (the massacre at Babi Yar). In the next step, often but not always, they identify the perpetrators. They then mention the transports of Jews to camps in Poland, and finally, they point out the large number of victims and explain the activities of the so-called Righteous Among the Nations. However, 2 out of 6 textbooks do not specify the overall number of Holocaust victims, although each mentions the number killed at Babi Yar (the reported figure is 100,000, including 34,000 Jews). In 5 out of 6 textbooks, there is no information about other murders, although the existence of concentration camps is mentioned. However, the main emphasis is on highlighting the role of the Righteous Among the Nations – a simple calculation shows that the segment on the heroism of these people often occupies even 25-30% of the entire reflection on the Holocaust.

In the *History of the World* textbooks, the Holocaust is described as a problem affecting the entire Europe. Most textbooks point out the existence of concentration camps and provide specific names (although there are occasional errors, with the terms concentration camp and death camp sometimes being indistinguishable). Each textbook mentions ghettos and the outbreaks of resistance there. However, it is clear that there is an unwillingness to dramatise the descriptions of the victims' actual tragedy: their suffering seems to undergo euphemism, and the conditions in ghettos or camps are not clearly defined (there are references, for example, to the "difficult situation of the prisoners"). This is well illustrated by the following quote from one of the textbooks:

In the death camps, there were no barracks for the prisoners, as existed in concentration camps. The victims who arrived at the railway stations were directed to the "showers" under the pretext of hygienic procedures. [W1, p. 185]

As a rule, each of the textbooks mentions the victims of the Holocaust as primarily Jews and emphasises the numerical scale of their extermination, which has already been shown by the previous quantitative analysis. The given estimates (approx. 6 million victims worldwide, from 1.2 to 1.4 million victims in Ukraine) seem reasonable. The authors of textbooks clearly indicate that the main victims of the Holocaust were Jews, but they sometimes place the victims of the Jewish nation in one row with the victims of Ukrainians, Roma and Sinti.

When referring to perpetrators, textbooks usually include terms such as "Germans", "occupiers" or "Nazis". Most textbooks point to members of the Einsatzgruppen as the

main perpetrators. Once again, however, a strictly political and historical perspective is presented here, but there is no reflection on the composition of these units, their motivations or methods of operation.

Four Einsatzgruppen, specifically created (two of them, “C” and “D”, operated in Ukraine), were tasked with exterminating “enemy and racially inferior elements”, particularly representatives of the Jewish population and the Roma community. [U5, 211]

None of the textbooks mention the potential involvement of Ukrainians in the Holocaust. This is interesting because Ukrainian textbooks generally discuss the topic of collaboration, and often even precisely indicate its manifestations. However, this in no way applies to the phenomenon of the Holocaust, which is to remain a distant, external and purely Nazi process.

Analysing the content of the textbooks themselves, we come to the conclusion that, first of all, they present a vision of the Holocaust as a German and political problem, not a social one. It is emphasised that this phenomenon was of a mass nature. The question of how these people actually died is also completely ignored: only Babi Yar is mentioned. At the same time, we know that up to 1.4 million Jews died in Ukraine, of which only 2% were murdered in Babi Yar, and only about half died in death camps.³⁸ The topic of other pogroms and mass

³⁸ Thomas Sandkühler, *“Endlösung” in Galizien: Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsaktion von Berthold Beitz* (Bonn: Dietz, J.H.W., Nachf., 1996), 460.

shootings, in which – according to estimates by T. Sandkühler – around 215,000 Ukrainian Jews perished (approximately 41% of all victims in Ukraine), is completely omitted at this point.³⁹ This topic is abandoned as it is probably inconvenient: it is precisely when mentioning these pogroms that the difficult topic of Ukrainians' complicity in crimes should be raised.

Summary

The analysis of the core curriculum and the content of textbooks made it possible to generally determine the nature of the discourse on the Holocaust in Ukraine. On this basis, several basic conclusions can be formulated:

1. The topic of the Holocaust is certainly not completely ignored in Ukrainian education, and students are provided with a certain base of information, which is a good starting point for further considerations.
2. The subject of the Holocaust constitutes a very small part of the content (approximately 1%). Therefore, the textbooks omit issues such as a broader reflection on European anti-Semitism and the causes of the Holocaust, and there is no detailed information on the functioning of the Nazi system.
3. Frequency analysis indicates that the Holocaust is clearly linked in Ukrainian textbooks with the tragedy of the Jew-

³⁹ *Ibidem.*

ish nation, and at the level of the language itself, oppression, destruction and suffering are clearly indicated as the basic components of the Holocaust policy.

4. As a rule, the number and identity of the victims are accurately determined, but the perpetrators are talked about in a more derogatory manner, leaving aside the issue of Ukrainians' complicity in the Holocaust. Apart from Babi Yar, there is no mention of any other mass pogroms or shootings in Ukraine.

It can be concluded – following the previously mentioned typology of Boroń – that the model of universal memory is implemented in Ukrainian education: The Holocaust is presented rather as a historical and political event and one of the greatest genocides, but in its own way not anchored in broader processes and similar to other genocides, out of scale, inconspicuous against this background. Referring to Podolsky's typology, it could be concluded that, in principle, textbooks continue the nationalist narrative: The Holocaust and anti-Semitism are presented here as problems imposed from the outside, products of the Third Reich's policy, which – although terrible in their scale – are not an integral part of the part of Ukrainian identity. Such a reflection lacks considerations on the complicity of Ukrainians in crimes, but the heroism of those who helped Jews comes to the fore.

Therefore, it seems that in this matter it may be necessary to finally introduce some changes, aimed primarily at even greater empowerment of Holocaust victims, highlighting their universal tragedy and the importance of European

anti-Semitism and explaining the sources of the Holocaust more precisely. At the same time, the belief that the subject of the Holocaust does not exist at all in Ukrainian textbooks should be firmly rejected, and that the “filtering of memory”, the manifestations of which are presented in these considerations, does not remain a particularly unique phenomenon in this respect, but rather should be treated as a problem universal to many educational policies of many other countries.

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The EU and Protection of Heritage

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Abstract

This chapter consists of the European Union's (EU) efforts to protect and promote cultural heritage, recognizing its role in shaping a shared European identity, influencing international relations, and passing on traditions to future generations. The EU supports collaboration among its Member States through many initiatives like the European Heritage Label, European Capital of Culture, or the Creative Europe program, aiming to both protect and promote both cultural heritage.

The main body of the chapter offers a detailed analysis of EU policies and initiatives, shedding light on the dynamic and evolving landscape of heritage conservation within Europe. It highlights the key institutions, treaties, agendas, and work plans that the EU has implemented to safeguard and celebrate cultural heritage.

Additionally, the chapter examines the EU's response to contemporary challenges such as climate change, armed conflicts and migration. It emphasizes the importance of preserving cultural heritage for fostering social cohesion, economic

development, and intercultural understanding. Moreover, it discusses the opportunities for research and innovation in the digital age and technological advancements.

Keywords: Cultural heritage, protection, promotion, initiative, intangible heritage

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a unique political and economic union of twenty-seven member states, which is a testament to the rich and diverse cultural heritage of the continent. At the heart of EU's doings is a commitment to preserving and celebrating the history, culture and traditions of every single member state, and the whole Europe, which is not just a reminder of the times gone by, but also a beacon of EU's shared values and aspirations.

In the recent years, the topic of protection of cultural heritage has ascended to a prominent position in academic research and EU's agenda. Its value becomes increasingly more important, especially regarding fostering a sense of a shared European identity. In this chapter, I will try to examine EU's strategies and key policies in heritage protection, explain its legal competences, the instrumental use of EU's power in the realm of heritage and how heritage integrates into Union's broader economic and social goals.

In this exploration, I will display the EU's role as a guardian of cultural heritage, not just within Europe but also on the global stage. I will examine how the EU balances the preserva-

tion of both tangible and intangible heritage while navigating contemporary challenges like climate change, wars, conflicts, globalization, and socio-political changes.

Historical Context and Evolution of EU's Commitment to Heritage

The European Union's engagement with cultural heritage has not been static but has evolved significantly over the decades. In the early days of the EU, cultural heritage was seen as a national concern, with the Union primarily focusing on economic and political integration. However, as the Union grew larger and more tightly integrated, the value of cultural heritage within the Union became increasingly apparent, especially when it comes to a shared identity, necessitating a more active role in its preservation and promotion.

It can be said that the precursor of EU's heritage policy was the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, adopted in The Hague on 14 May 1954 under UNESCO, which first introduced the concept 'heritage of humanity' into international law.¹ It set the basic principles for protecting cultural sites and artifacts, stressing that nations have a collective responsibility to safeguard cultural heritage, not just within their own borders but as part of the world's shared legacy.

¹ UNESCO, "Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954", accessed February 7, 2024, https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/1954_Convention_EN_2020.pdf.

However, in case of the EU, the first seminal moment in this evolution of recognition was the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This treaty, for the first time, included provisions related to culture, acknowledging it as an essential area of cooperation within the Union. Article 128 of the Treaty established that ‘the EU shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity’.² This was a crucial step in elevating the status of cultural heritage within the EU’s policy framework.

Following the Maastricht Treaty, the EU gradually developed a more robust approach towards cultural heritage. This involved not only the protection and preservation of physical heritage sites but also the promotion of Europe’s cultural diversity and the fostering of a shared European identity under the umbrella of many designated programmes and legal frameworks.

Culture 2000 was one of the first programmes designated to the protection and promotion of heritage. It aimed to provide funding and support for cultural cooperation projects across Europe. It ran until 2006 and the programme’s funds provided grants to cultural cooperation projects in the artistic and cultural fields, including: performing arts, literature but most importantly for this chapter: heritage and cultural history.³ Soon after, in 2002, the EU Prize for Cultural Heritage

² European Union, “Article 128 of Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Text)”, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT>.

³ European Commission, “Culture 2000 Programme”, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/resources/creative-europe-previous-programmes/culture-2000-programme>.

was launched and awarded by the NGO Europa Nostra. Each year it rewards around thirty initiatives that add to the preservation, advancement, and the adaptation to new uses of cultural heritage.⁴ In 2005, we saw the creation of European Heritage Label, a recognition awarded to buildings, monuments and artifacts which can be regarded as landmarks in the history of today's Europe.⁵ Beginning from 2013, it fell under the framework of Creative Europe programme.

Then, 2018 was designated as the European Year of Cultural Heritage, which further underscored the EU's commitment to cultural heritage. This initiative aimed to encourage people to reflect on heritage's place in their lives, and to appreciate its importance to diversity and intercultural dialogue. Activities and events throughout the year promoted heritage as a shared resource and highlighted its role in fostering a shared European identity.⁶

Moreover, the EU's role in heritage protection has extended to the international arena. Through various initiatives and programmes, such as previously mentioned, the EU has engaged in global heritage protection efforts. This also includes collaboration with UNESCO and other international

⁴ European Commission, "European Heritage Awards", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/initiatives-and-success-stories/european-heritage-awards>.

⁵ European Commission, "European Heritage Label", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/initiatives-and-success-stories/european-heritage-label>.

⁶ European Commission, "European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/eu-policy-for-cultural-heritage/european-year-of-cultural-heritage-2018>.

organizations to safeguard heritage sites that are at risk due to conflict or natural disasters.

Frameworks for Heritage Protection in the EU

The European Union's frameworks and initiatives derive directly from its treaties, directives, conventions, and programmes. All of them combined create the foundation for the EU's efforts in safeguarding and promoting cultural heritage. Central to this framework are several key instruments and policies that outline the EU's role and responsibilities in this area.

The Treaty of Maastricht, as previously mentioned, was the first major step in integrating cultural heritage into the EU's legal framework which was later mirrored in the Treaty of Lisbon. To fulfil its cultural mandate, the EU can only adopt recommendations and incentive measures, with no harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States, as provided by Article 167(5) in the now-modern Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The formulation of cultural policies remains in the hands of the Member States. However, the Union 'shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.'⁷

⁷ European Union, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E167>.

Enacted based on what is now Article 114 TFEU, Directive 93/7/EEC addresses the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from a member state's territory. This directive covers a wide range of objects, including those of historical, paleontological, ethnographic, and numismatic interest, or of scientific value, provided they are classified as national treasures by member states. In the context of the directive, these objects, recognized as national treasures, are also considered part of the 'cultural heritage of European significance'.⁸

Directive 2014/52/EU on the other hand underscores the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on cultural heritage but makes no direct reference to European cultural heritage. It mentions only that the cultural heritage which comes under its scope comprises 'urban historical sites and landscapes, which are an integral part of the cultural diversity that the Union is committed to respecting and promoting in accordance with Article 167(4) TFEU'.⁹

The EU's strategic framework for cultural heritage also has its roots in the Communication from The Commission to The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions dubbed 'Towards an integrated approach to cultural

⁸ European Union, "Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A31993L0007>.

⁹ European Union, "Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0052>.

heritage for Europe.’ It highlights cultural heritage’s role as an asset for all, but also a responsibility for all, shares an opinion about its contribution to economic growth and social cohesion, as well as a source of social innovation for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. It also sets in stone the need for strengthening policy cooperation at all levels, national and international levels.¹⁰

Apart from treaties, directives and communications, the EU’s framework also includes separate frameworks, work plans and agendas such as New European Agenda for Culture (2018). It emphasizes that heritage is entangled with culture and social cohesion and the rise of its importance can lead to the increase of well-being among EU citizens. Cultural heritage is also a driving economic factor in various regions, as it is intricately linked to tourism, conservation, and job creation. In the point of view of the European Commission, the value of using heritage as a mean of fostering mutual understanding between nations is also not to be ignored.¹¹

On 29 November 2022, The European Council 2023-26 Work Plan for Culture was adopted by the Council of Culture Ministers of the European Union. It sets out four concrete actions: empowering the cultural and creative sectors, enhancing cultural participation and the role of culture in society, un-

¹⁰ European Commission, “Towards an Integrated Approach to Cultural Heritage for Europe”, COM (2014) 477 final, July 22, 2014, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0477>.

¹¹ European Commission, “New European Agenda for Culture”, COM (2018) 267 final, May 22, 2018, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:267:FIN>.

leashing the power of culture, and strengthening the cultural dimension of EU external relations. When it comes to heritage itself, it considers the devastating consequences of the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine which threatens to destroy the rich cultural heritage of Ukraine, and climate changes' impact on natural environments and historical landmarks, as well as recognizes heritage's intrinsic value and contribution to strengthening European identity.¹² Thanks to the plan, events like stock talking, thematic workshops, conferences and seminars now take place to show light on those issues.

The European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage (2018) also aims to capture and scale up the success of the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018. It reflects the common set-up for heritage-related activities at European level, primarily in EU policies and programmes, and includes around sixty actions implemented by the European Commission in 2019 and 2020, in five thematic areas: inclusivity and access, sustainability, resilience, innovation, and global partnerships.¹³

¹² Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusion on the Work Plan for Culture (2019-2022)", 2018/C 460/10, December 7, 2018, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022G1207%2801%29&qid=1671635488811>.

¹³ Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport, and Culture, "European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage", Publication Office of the European Union, May 27, 2019, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5a9c3144-80f1-11e9-9f05-01aa75ed71a1>.

Beyond Protection: Promotion of Cultural Heritage by the EU

The European Union's approach to cultural heritage is not limited to just preservation; it also encompasses a dynamic promotion of heritage across its member states through several key programmes. These initiatives aim not just to safeguard cultural assets but to actively enhance their visibility, accessibility, and appreciation, both within Europe and globally.

Creative Europe

The Creative Europe Programme stands as a prime example of how the EU goes beyond the preservation of cultural heritage as this programme is dedicated to supporting, not necessarily protecting, cultural and creative sectors. Its dual focus includes providing funding to collaborative cultural projects across Europe and promoting the mobility of artists and their works.¹⁴ For instance, Creative Europe has supported the circulation of European films, ensuring they reach a broader audience by funding subtitling and distribution across different countries which can be accessed at the Creative Europe project database.¹⁵ This not only preserves film as a cultural artifact but also promotes the diversity of European film culture.

¹⁴ European Commission. "Creative Europe". Culture and Creativity. Accessed April 21, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe>.

¹⁵ European Commission. "Creative Europe Database." Accessed April 21, 2024, <https://creative-europe-media-database.eacea.ec.europa.eu/search?q=>.

European Heritage Label

The European Heritage Label (EHL) goes beyond simply recognizing sites that are important to Europe's history and heritage. By awarding the EHL, the EU creates opportunities for education and cultural exchange. Designated sites are encouraged to develop educational programmes and collaborative projects that engage young Europeans, promoting an understanding of shared history and values.¹⁶ One of such examples is the Seminaarinmäki Campus in Finland. It symbolizes the educational systems in both Finland and Europe, emphasizing the foundational role of education in fostering an equal and democratic society. Today, the site still functions as a leading university, as one of the three campuses at the University of Jyväskylä. The European Heritage Label recognition of this site was based on several key aspects such as the historical significance in Finnish and European education, as well as contribution to democratic values, especially in preventing social exclusion, embracing inclusivity, equality, and peaceful coexistence of people.¹⁷

¹⁶ European Commission. "European Heritage Label sites". Culture and Creativity. Accessed April 21, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/initiatives-and-success-stories/european-heritage-label>.

¹⁷ European Commission. "Seminaarinmäki Campus (Finland)." Culture and Creativity. Accessed April 21, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/initiatives-and-success-stories/european-heritage-label/european-heritage-label-sites/seминаarinmaki-campus-finland>.

European Capital of Culture

The main goal of European Capital of Culture (ECOC, historically European Cultural City) is to elevate certain cultural landscapes of Europe that are designated each year to be the titular capital of culture. The objectives of this program include promoting cultural diversity, enhancing the international profile of urban areas, and fostering economic growth through tourism and cultural activities.¹⁸ Cities selected for this designation implement a year-long series of cultural events and projects that showcase their cultural heritage and contemporary cultural creation.

While European Capital of Culture is not specifically intended to protect – or rather – preserve cultural heritage, it supports the promotion of cultural heritage to an extent that allows the local landscape to thrive years and remain alive after the initial year of the programme has ended. The impact and visibility of the ECOC programme have been profound. For instance, as investigated by the Impacts 18 study, when Liverpool was named European Capital of Culture in 2008, the city saw a 50% growth in grassroots cultural initiatives throughout Liverpool’s inner-city between 2005–2018, as well as a diversification in focus to involve more education, employment and training, and greater emphasis on mental

¹⁸ European Commission. “European Capitals of Culture”. Culture and Creativity. Accessed April 21, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/policies/culture-in-cities-and-regions/european-capitals-of-culture>.

health, wellbeing and social inclusion.^{19, 20} Similarly, as reported in the Ex-post evaluation of the 2019 European capitals of culture, Matera, despite being only a city of 60000 residents, after its designation in 2019 brought renewed attention to its ancient cave dwellings and helped in preserving and promoting Southern Italy's cultural and historical heritage by restoring and hosting hotels, restaurants and other cultural spaces such as theatres, museums or exhibiting places.²¹ These examples highlight the programme's role in not only boosting local economies through tourism but also in preserving and enhancing awareness of Europe's cultural assets.

Lastly, we have the EU programmes which in varying aspects contribute to the protection of heritage such as Natura 2000, a network of conservation areas across the EU,²² the European Green Deal, which indirectly helps buildings and

¹⁹ European Commission. "Ex-post Evaluation of 2007 & 2008 European Capitals of Culture". Accessed April 21, 2024, https://culture.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/capitals-culture-2007-08-evaluation_en.pdf.

²⁰ "Impact of European Capital of Culture still felt in Liverpool a decade on". University of Liverpool, 2018. Accessed April 21, 2024, <https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2018/10/09/impact-of-european-capital-of-culture-still-felt-in-liverpool-a-decade-on/>.

²¹ "Ex-post evaluation of the 2019 European capitals of culture". Publications Office of the European Union, 2019. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/01ae1db0-3a98-11eb-b27b-01aa75ed71a1>.

²² European Commission, "Natura 2000 and Cultural Landscapes", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/cultural-heritage-in-eu-policies/natura-2000-and-cultural-landscapes>.

objects sustainable in the era of climate change²³ or in projects like Horizon 2000 (now Horizon Europe), which aim to fund research and innovation. Thanks to Horizon 2000, projects like SPOT, SmartCulTour and IMPACTOUR could be implemented.²⁴

Critical Analysis of the EU's Cultural Heritage Policies

The boost in local economies and preservation measures inevitably lead to a clash between protection and profitability. Undeniably, EU cultural heritage policies such as European Heritage Label and the European Capital of Culture initiative have successfully raised awareness, funds and appreciation for cultural diversity and history, fostering a sense of a shared European identity.

However, the impact of these policies can be negligible in some cases, the programmes themselves are not a golden solution. On one hand, EU initiatives have supported the preservation of a diverse cultural heritage in the face of globalization by funding conservation efforts and facilitating pan-European cultural projects. On the other hand, the initiatives themselves can also be a cost that doesn't repay themselves. Some of the

²³ European Commission, "The European Green Deal", accessed February 7, 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.

²⁴ European Commission, "Sustainable Cultural Tourism", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/cultural-heritage-in-eu-policies/sustainable-cultural-tourism>.

designated European Capitals of Culture had neglectable return of investments. A good contrast between a well-implemented initiative and a less successful one could be observed in 2014 when Riga and Umeå were designated as the capital cities. A report published by the EU on that matter suggests that Umeå was more successful than Riga.²⁵

As it is reported by the Commission of the European Parliament, the ECOC enabled Umeå to increase the European – and international – dimension by collaborations with some international artists, who were invited or commissioned to produce or co-produce events, works and exhibitions. Overall, 195 projects featured some sort of collaboration with artists or other cultural bodies from other (mainly European) countries.²⁶ Umeå 2014 did make the most of the ECOC status in its efforts to attract European audiences to the city and put itself ‘on the map’ thanks to its marketing and communication activities. In this regard, the ‘Caught by [Umeå]’ tour brought representatives of the city and its cultural sector into direct contact with audiences in several different European cities prior to the opening of the title year to attract them to

²⁵ European Commission. “Ex-post Evaluation of the 2014 European Capitals of Culture (Umeå and Riga)”. EUR-Lex. Access to European Union law., 2015. Accessed 21 April 2024. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1482221496367&uri=C ELEX:52015DC0580>.

²⁶ European Commission. “Ex-post Evaluation of the 2014 European Capitals of Culture (Umeå and Riga)”. EUR-Lex. Access to European Union law., 2015. Accessed 21 April 2024. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1482221496367&uri=C ELEX:52015DC0580>.

Umeå. Furthermore, the number of nights booked in all tourist accommodations increased by 24% from 2013 to 2014.²⁷

On the other hand, regarding raising the international profile of the city (a key motivation of the ECOC project), Rīga 2014 had mixed results. The number of foreign tourists visiting Latvia increased by 18.9% in the first half of 2014 and 2,800 publications mentioned the ECOC in Rīga (of which 98% were positive), but it appears that less than 2% of the audiences came from outside the country.²⁸ And while preservation of the national cultural heritage is important, Rīga shows that EU's initiatives can fail in the mission of fostering a shared European unity despite incorporating themes that are universal to many Central and Eastern European member states as many projects highlighted shared European experiences referencing World War I²⁹ or the times of the Eastern Bloc.

²⁷ European Commission. "Ex-post Evaluation of the 2014 European Capitals of Culture (Umeå and Riga)". EUR-Lex. Access to European Union law., 2015. Accessed 21 April 2024. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1482221496367&uri=C ELEX:52015DC0580>.

²⁸ European Commission. "Ex-post Evaluation of the 2014 European Capitals of Culture (Umeå and Riga)". EUR-Lex. Access to European Union law., 2015. Accessed 21 April 2024. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1482221496367&uri=C ELEX:52015DC0580>.

²⁹ European Commission. "Ex-post Evaluation of the 2014 European Capitals of Culture (Umeå and Riga)". EUR-Lex. Access to European Union law., 2015. Accessed 21 April 2024. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1482221496367&uri=C ELEX:52015DC0580>.

While EU cultural heritage policies and initiatives have achieved significant successes in promoting and preserving European culture, they can also fail and lead to profits not big enough that would justify the initiatives that took place.

Challenges and Opportunities

It is safe to say that most of the key tasks related to the protection itself of cultural heritage are challenges rather than opportunities. However, there are some areas where there are opportunities related to recording, protecting, and sharing cultural heritage.

One of the most obvious examples is the armed conflicts, which have been made clear to us in recent times by the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Historical buildings, museums, and places of worship are often attacked to demoralize populations or erase cultural identities. Aside from the case of Ukraine, the shelling of Dubrovnik in Croatia during the Yugoslav Wars is also a stark reminder of how cultural heritage can become collateral damage or a target in conflicts.³⁰

Cultural heritage, as the EU puts it, also plays a crucial role in shaping a shared European identity, especially when it comes to preserving Europe's intangible cultural heritage. This includes folkloric traditions, languages, and crafts that

³⁰ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Dubrovnik and Crimes against Cultural Heritage”, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://www.icty.org/en/outreach/documentaries/dubrovnik-and-crimes-against-cultural-heritage>.

are essential for maintaining the continent's cultural diversity and historical continuity. The EU goes beyond mere preservation by actively promoting these living traditions and ensuring they are passed down to future generations. The challenge lies in adapting these traditions to the contemporary context without losing their essence and significance. In cases like this, it is worth noting that it is impossible to completely preserve heritage, as it is a living organism of some sorts. Therefore, it is important to be able to share the point of view of begone ancestors to completely new and different people. The EU meets this challenge by supporting documentation, research, and educational initiatives that celebrate and preserve intangible heritage. Projects like COURAGE and TRACES, aim to document various artefacts, objects, and sites in user-friendly databases.³¹

Migration also significantly influences the cultural landscape of Europe. The arrival of people from other cultural backgrounds enriches the European continent with new customs, stories, and artistic expressions. This diversity presents a unique opportunity to broaden the scope of European culture, introducing novel elements that can be integrated into the broader cultural narrative. At the same time, it challenges the EU to find ways to ensure harmonious integration while preserving the cultural identities of both the migrant and host communities.

³¹ European Commission, “Research and Innovation”, accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/cultural-heritage-in-eu-policies/research-and-innovation>.

Fostering a shared European identity can also be challenging in the times of raising nationalism and regionalism in certain areas of the EU. These dynamics can lead to selective interpretation or even exclusion of certain heritages from the European narrative, undermining the EU's goals of cultural integration and mutual understanding. Beforementioned initiatives like the European Capital of Culture are not golden solutions and even large-scale projects can fail to gather international audiences.

Climate change also proves to be a matter in need of addressing as it threatens the preservation of historical sites, monuments, and landscapes. Rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and increased erosion and decay rates endanger the structural integrity and longevity of these many European sites. Many cultural heritage sites in Europe rely on their links with nature, such as The Rila Monastery Natural Park located in Bulgaria (which is also a UNESCO World Heritage Site) or the Burren national park in Ireland, included in the UNESCO Global Geopark Network.³²

It is also important to realize that EU focused not only on protection but also promotion. In that regard, the EU has some of the most visible activities of support for cultural heritage worldwide in the form of European Capital of Culture, European Heritage Label and Creative Europe programmes.

³² European Commission, "Natura 2000 and Cultural Landscapes", accessed February 7, 2024, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/cultural-heritage/cultural-heritage-in-eu-policies/natura-2000-and-cultural-landscapes>.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the European Union's approach to the protection of cultural heritage includes both promotional and direct protection measures. The EU sees cultural heritage as a living and ever evolving force and is actively pursuing both its preservation and celebration with member states as well as the European continent.

The EU's legal and policy framework, established by the Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, provides a solid foundation for heritage protection. This framework, complemented by various directives, agendas, work plans and initiatives, illustrates the EU's commitment to protecting both tangible and intangible cultural heritage. The integration of heritage along with broader economic and social objectives, including tourism or urban revitalization, demonstrates that the European Union sees cultural heritage as a living and integral part of Europe's present and future generations.

In addition to this, the EU also executes some of the most visible promotion initiatives worldwide. The EHL, ECOC and Creative Europe programmes present a cohesive and multi-directional, albeit not perfect, approach to cultural heritage issues. The Union sees value in not only preserving old artefacts and historical sites, but also promoting living and thriving culture, both modern and traditional.

Moreover, the challenges and opportunities of migration, intangible heritage, climate change and cultural landscapes are addressed as they arise, and are met with adequate plans and initiatives. The EU adeptly tackles challenges and harnesses opportunities presented by migration, intangible heritage,

climate change, and cultural landscapes through strategic plans and initiatives. This approach underscores the EU's resilience, allowing it to navigate and thrive in changing social, political, cultural, and environmental landscapes. However, it's important to remember that the EU must operate within the limits of its authority, which stops at the competences of its member states.

In summary, the role of the European Union in the protection and promotion of cultural heritage is a testament to its understanding of the value of cultural heritage, as the Commission puts it, 'a shared source of remembrance, understanding, identity, dialogue, cohesion and creativity, capable of enriching the lives of people.'

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Food Heritage – Uniqueness, Identity, and Its Protection. Case Of Obwarzanek Krakowski

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Abstract

Food is one of the most important part of our lives. Its influence on culture and politics is becoming more and more visible, and national cuisine is becoming an integral element of heritage, both at the national and regional levels. Food is also starting to become an element of consideration in many scientific disciplines, not only the classic ones but also new ones, such as food studies. One of the unique elements of the culinary heritage of Kraków and małopolska is the obwarzanek. Its history, dating back centuries, and the traditional manufacturing process have become the determinants of the identity of the southern Poland inhabitants. In this chapter, the author will present the obwarzanek as an element of local heritage and a part of city branding along with the issue of protection of culinary heritage by the European Union on the example of the Register of Protected Geographical Indications.

Keywords: Food Heritage, Food studies, Obwarzanek krakowski, Register of Protected Geographical Indications

Introduction

In recent years our world has been changing faster and faster. We are witnessing wars, conflicts, climate changes, and natural disasters. What is more, we are becoming a society in which modern technologies are becoming an important, if not one of the most important elements of our functioning. Despite many changes, great difficulties, and numerous challenges that modern man faces there is one fundamental issue that does not distinguish him from his ancient ancestors. This issue is the need for food. Food has been with people forever. Over thousands of years of community development, people settled in new areas, which involved the cultivation of various plants and animals from which dishes were prepared, and these meals became the basis of national cuisines. Geography played an important role in this process, having a huge impact on the diet of many societies, especially those living in different climatic regions. It is also impossible not to mention the development of machines and devices that influenced the formation of culinary traditions. Currently, in times of multicultural societies, culinary culture has become a determinant of identity and difference. On the other hand, it has also become an element of promoting national or local culture through taste or culinary tourism which is becoming more and more popular nowadays. It is also necessary to emphasize the great impact of culinary culture on politics, a perfect example here is the Russian-Ukrainian borscht war.

In this chapter, the author will try to present the issue of food heritage, its role, and place in heritage studies discourse using one of the most famous Polish bakery product, obwarzanek krakowski. Additionally, the author's task will be to indicate how food heritage is protected and promoted on the example of granting a protected geographical indication certificate.

Food and Heritage

Heritage is one of the most important topic in social and humanistic science nowadays. Scientists from all over the world reflect on the topic of heritage from different perspectives. A large number of national or international organisations associations, and federations have been set up to deal with this issue. The following entry can be found on the UNESCO website: "Heritage is our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations. Our cultural and natural heritage are both irreplaceable sources of life and inspiration".¹ This is not a classic definition of the concept but it very adequately reflects the purpose for which so many federations and researchers deal with it and shows why it is worth doing. However, trying to formulate a definition of this concept is not easy due to its ambiguity. The dictionary of the Polish language defines heritage as "cultural, scientific and

¹ Official website of UNESCO, access February 2024, <https://www.unesco.org/en/world-heritage>.

artistic assets left behind by previous generations”² For the purposes of this paper, however, the author focuses on issues of cultural heritage. Jan Pruszyński defined cultural heritage as „a stock of immovable and movable things together with associated spiritual values, historical phenomena, and customs recognised as a basic for legal protection for the good of a particular society and its development and for their transmission to future generations due to understandable and accepted historical, patriotic, religious, scientific and artistic values, which are important for the identity and continuity of political social and cultural development, proving truths and the commemoration of historical events, the cultivation of a sense of beauty and community of civilization”³ Food heritage absolutely falls within the above definition. Food is a resource related to the values, history, traditions, and customs of the members of a community which are passed on from generation to generation in various ways to ensure continuity and maintain identity. According to the views of the representatives of doctrine, the food heritage definition is very broad, as it includes both material aspects, such as products, tools used in the kitchen, tableware, but also immaterial aspects such as rituals and traditions that make up the culinary culture of a given society.⁴ Food heritage can also be considered as one

² Polish language dictionary PWN, access February 2024, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/szukaj/Dziedzictwo%20.html>.

³ Jan Pruszyński, *Dziedzictwo kultury Polski: jego straty i ochrona prawna*, T.1 , (Kraków: Zakamycze 2001), 50.

⁴ Mohammad Almansouri, Ruud Verkerk, Vincenzo Fogliano, Pieter-nel A. Luning, Exploration of heritage food concept, *Trends in Food Science & Technology*, Volume 111, (2021), 790–797.

of the branches of food studies – an interdisciplinary science that studies food from the perspective of fields such as history, cultural studies, sociology, philosophy, law, and pedagogies.

Obwarzanek krakowski

Many regions of the world have products or elements of local cuisine that symbolize it and are considered an indicator of identity. For Kraków, the city located in the Lesser Poland Voivodeship (Małopolska) in southern Poland, such an element is undoubtedly obwarzanek. The history of this confection dates back to the Middle Ages and it has almost 600 years of tradition. According to historical research, the first mention of obwarzanek being baked in and around Kraków can be found in the accounts of the court of King Władysław Jagiełło and Queen Jadwiga. One of these, dated 2 March 1394, contains the information “for the Queen, for the ring of obwarzanek, 1 grosz”.⁵ The Kraków bakers’ guild was responsible for baking obwarzanki. Initially, they were baked very rarely by designated bakers. In the Middle Ages, their production was linked to Easter, because they could only be baked during Lent. Later, they were baked all year round, but only on Fridays. From the XIX century to the present day,

⁵ Official shortened version of the application paper of Obwarzanek krakowski on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XC0216\(01\), C 38/11](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XC0216(01), C 38/11).

they have been baked every day.⁶ An obwarzanek is a bakery product made from yeast dough shaped like a ring. The dough is prepared from the following ingredients: flour, fat, yeast, water, sugar, salt and honey.

The above ingredients are mixed and left to the rise. The next stage of production is parboiling, i.e. cooking the raw dough at a temperature of approximately 90 degrees Celsius. Obwarzanki prepared this way are decorated with sesame seed, poppy seed, salt, cheese, and herbs mixed. The resulting product is baked and then ready for consumption.⁷ It is also worth pointing out that obwarzanki prepared this way are sold, among other things, in specially marked stalls located in various parts of Kraków. In 2010, obwarzanek krakowski was entered in the register of protected geographical indications of the European Union.⁸ The formal registration of this procedure will be discussed in the last chapter of paper.

⁶ Elżbieta Wiącek, „Małopolska tradycja zaklęta w smakach i zapachach” in *Semiotyczna mapa Małopolski*, ed. Elżbieta Wiącek, Księgarnia Akademicka 2015, 424.

⁷ Official shortened version of the application paper of Obwarzanek krakowski on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XC0216\(01\), C 38/8 – C 38/10](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XC0216(01), C 38/8 – C 38/10).

⁸ Official website of Żywego Muzeum Obwarzanka, access February 2024, <https://www.muzeumobwarzanka.com/historia-obwarzanka/>.

Obwarzanek krakowski as a part of city promotion

Each city is made of several elements. Firstly, it is the territorial area in which a given city is located. This territory in a geographical sense is so important because it significantly determines the identity of this place. Another element is the history of the area which can be extremely difficult and dark but it can also be very beautiful. The next obligatory element of every city is its people. It is thanks to people and their creativity that cities become places of emergence and development of local cultures, both in tangible and intangible aspects. The final piece of this puzzle is public authority that manages the city. Its duty is not only to handle all administrative matters related to the functioning of each city but also to care for its residents, listening to their needs and caring for their self-development by supporting grassroots initiatives. The city's tasks also include taking care of local cultural heritage and promoting it both in the country and internationally. This type of promotion can be described as local government diplomacy. Polish political scientist Magdalena Bierzyńska-Sudoł in one of her articles defines local government diplomacy as „the ability to promote units of local government – municipalities, regions – both in Poland and abroad with the support of Polish diplomatic and consular missions, Polish communities and usage of the internet”.⁹ Kraków city authorities have used obwarzanek for marketing purposes on a number of occa-

⁹ Magdalena Bierzyńska-Sudoł, “Dyplomacja samorządowa jako innowacyjny instrument zarządzania regionem”, *Świat Idei i Polityki*, T.15, (2016), 233.

sions. Over the years, this bakery product has been included in the promotional strategy for the city of Kraków, alongside such recognised icons as the Lajkonik, the Smok Wawelski, the Kościół Mariacki and the Zamek Królewski na Wawelu.¹⁰ Obwarzanek has become an obligatory element of the Święto Chleba (The Bread Festival), a cyclical event held in Kraków for many years. During this event, visitors can not only taste many types of bakery products but also listen to interesting lectures on the history of gastronomy.¹¹ Since 2017 Żywe Muzeum Obwarzanka has been operating in the city. Its main tasks include passing on knowledge about this culinary symbol of the city and conducting practical workshops and lectures for schoolchildren, families, and senior citizens¹². Obwarzanek is also a motif of a statuette that has been awarded since 2005 to Kraków best restaurants by Kraków City Hall and the Krakowska Konfederacja Kupiecka (eng. Krakow Merchant Confederation). In addition, the doors of the awarded eating place are marked with a sticker bearing an image of this pastry.¹³ It is also worth noting that in recent years, new events such as the Dzień Obwarzanka (eng.

¹⁰ Promotion Strategy Document for Kraków 2008–2012, 5.

¹¹ „Trwa 12 Święto Chleba”, accessed February 2024, https://www.krakow.pl/aktualnosci/192522,31,komunikat,trwa_12__swieto_chleba.html.

¹² Official website of Żywe Muzeum Obwarzanka, access February 2024, <https://www.muzeumobwarzanka.com/o-nas/>.

¹³ Mariusz Grębowiec, „Rola produktów tradycyjnych i regionalnych w budowaniu konkurencyjnej oferty regionu małopolskiego w Unii Europejskiej na przykładzie „Obwarzanka Krakowskiego””, *Zeszyty Naukowe Szkoły Głównej Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie*, T.14, (2014), 74.

Obwarzanek Day) and Święto Obwarzanka (eng. Obwarzanek Festival) have been established.

Protection of food heritage

As pointed out earlier, food with its history, rituals, traditional forms and elements of preparation should undoubtedly be recognized as heritage, and therefore protected in the best and the most effective way possible, ensuring its continuity. In the recent years, it has been possible to observe that not only countries but also many international organizations notice that certain elements that make up a country's culinary culture are an expression of its identity and uniqueness. This is expressed by maintaining special lists on which protected elements are entered, as well as granting them special certificates. In the author's opinion, the most important international organizations that currently attach great importance to the protection of food heritage and culinary culture are the European Union and the United Nations.

The United Nations is undoubtedly the largest organization in the world, currently uniting 193 countries.¹⁴ The basic goals of the organization founded in 1945 include, above all, maintaining harmony and peace between states, safeguarding the principles of public international law, and promoting

¹⁴ Official website of the Central Statistical Office, access February 2024, <https://stat.gov.pl/statystyka-miedzynarodowa/instytucje-organizacje-miedzynarodowe/onz-organizacja-narodow-zjednoczonych/>.

human rights and sustainable development standards.¹⁵ Despite the above goals, the nations of the world have not forgotten the need to protect their culture and natural heritage. That's why on November 16, 1945 they established The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).¹⁶ The administrative and legal beginnings of heritage protection can be found in the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage issued by UNESCO in 1972.¹⁷ However, for the purpose of this chapter, the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage drawn up in 2003, is much more important.¹⁸ Based on this document, three lists were introduced:

- The Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity
- The List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding
- Register of Good Safeguarding Practices.¹⁹

¹⁵ Official website of the United Nations, access February 2024, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un>.

¹⁶ Official website of the Polish Committee for UNESCO, access February 2024, <https://www.unesco.pl/unesco/misja-unesco/>.

¹⁷ Official website of UNESCO, access February 2024, <https://www.unesco.org/en/world-heritage>.

¹⁸ Anna Przyborowska-Klimczak, „Międzynarodowa Ochrona Niematerialnego Dziedzictwa Kulturowego”, *Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowego, Europejskiego i Porównawczego*, vol. III, 2005, 5–6.

¹⁹ Official website of the Polish Committee for UNESCO, accessed February 2024, <https://www.unesco.pl/unesco/misja-unesco/>.

From the food heritage point of view, the most important are the first two lists, which contain examples of unique elements of the culinary culture of many countries from all over the world. As Dominik Orłowski and Magdalena Woźniczko point out, in the years 2010-2017, 25 elements were included on the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.²⁰ Examples of such elements are the Mediterranean diet, the Winegrowers' Festival in Vevey, or the Art of Neapolitan 'Pizzaiuolo'.²¹ In the last few years, further examples have been added to this list. A particularly important example in the current times and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war is the Culture of Ukrainian borscht cooking which was included on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding in 2022.²²

The procedure for registering a heritage element is multi-stage and requires the party preparing it to carry out analysis and submit appropriate documents constituting the application. However, the author decided to omit the description of the entire formal procedure because it is not the direct subject of this paper. To sum up, the activities of the United

²⁰ Dominik Orłowski, Magdalena Woźniczko, "Gastronomiczne unikaty na liście reprezentatywnej niematerialnego dziedzictwa ludzkości- inspiracją dla turystyki kulinarnej"; *Studia etnologiczne i antropologiczne*, T. 18, (2018), 105–118.

²¹ Official website of the Polish Committee for UNESCO, accessed February 2024, <https://www.unesco.pl/unesco/misja-unesco/>.

²² "Culture of Ukrainian Borscht Cooking Inscribed on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding." 1 July, 2022. Accessed Feb. 2024. <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/culture-ukrainian-borscht-cooking-inscribed-list-intangible-cultural-heritage-need-urgent>.

Nations, including UNESCO, to protect heritage, especially food heritage, and the promotion of local cuisines internationally should be considered very successful.

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Not only large actors in international relations, whose scope of action can be described as global, are trying to protect nutritional heritage. The organization that also tries to guard local products, dishes, and rituals that constitute food heritage of its member states is the European Union (EU). The Union's motto is united in diversity. This means that each country that is part of this organization is provided with freedom of action and guarantees assistance but is also encouraged to share its own identity and culture, thereby enriching other members and creating space for common development. The system of protection of unique products constituting the culinary culture of member states has been developed in the European Union on the model of geographical indications. Within this model, we can distinguish two categories:

- Geographical indications of agricultural, food products, and spirit drinks
- Traditional speciality guaranteed

In order to effectively help protect examples of culinary heritage, the EU has prepared detailed legal regulations specifying the protection procedure. They were established by the following legal acts:

- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs²³
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 664/2014 of 18 December 2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the establishment of the Union symbols for protected designations of origin, protected geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed and with regard to certain rules on sourcing, certain procedural rules and certain additional transitional rules²⁴

²³ Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, access February 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0668>.

²⁴ Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 664/2014 of 18 December 2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the establishment of the Union symbols for protected designations of origin, protected geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed and with regard to certain rules on sourcing, certain procedural rules and certain additional transitional rules, access February 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0664>.

- Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs²⁵

When we talk about geographical indications of agricultural and food products, we can distinguish three types of marks:

- Protected destination of origin
- Protected geographical indication
- Geographical indication of spirit drinks²⁶

The mark of Protected destination of origin is awarded to products that come from a specific place or region, when the quality or characteristic features of the product are due to a specific geographical environment, and all stages of production take place in a specific geographical area.²⁷

The mark of Protected geographical indication is awarded to a product that comes from a specific region or place, when

²⁵ Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, access February 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32012R1151>.

²⁶ Official website of European Commission, access February 2024, https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/farming/geographical-indications-and-quality-schemes/geographical-indications-and-quality-schemes-explained_en.

²⁷ Official website of the Patent Office of the Republic of Poland, access February 2024, <https://uprp.gov.pl/pl/przedmioty-ochrony/oznaczenia-geograficzne/oznaczenia-geograficzne-w-systemie-wspolnotowym>.

the name of the region or place serves to designate the product, and its characteristic feature results from its geographical origin. What's more, one stage of the production process must take place in this geographic area.²⁸

The mark of Geographical indication of spirit drink is given for the protection of the name of spirit drinks whose specific characteristics or reputation are linked to their geographical origin. Moreover, at least one of the production stages must take place in this region.²⁹

Last but absolutely not least is the Traditional speciality guaranteed mark. A product with this mark must have a specific feature that distinguishes it from other similar products, it must be produced using traditional methods and using traditional products, but it does not have to be related to a specific geographical area.³⁰

The registration procedure is two-stage: at the national and at the European level. The first stage of registration is carried out directly in the Member State. In Poland, the unit responsible for maintaining the product registration system

²⁸ Official website of the Patent Office of the Republic of Poland, access February 2024, <https://uwrp.gov.pl/pl/przedmioty-ochrony/oznaczenia-geograficzne/oznaczenia-geograficzne-w-systemie-wspolnotowym>.

²⁹ Official website of European Commission, access February 2024, https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/farming/geographical-indications-and-quality-schemes/geographical-indications-and-quality-schemes-explained_en.

³⁰ Official website of the Patent Office of the Republic of Poland, access February 2024, <https://uwrp.gov.pl/pl/przedmioty-ochrony/oznaczenia-geograficzne/oznaczenia-geograficzne-w-systemie-wspolnotowym>.

is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The registration procedure begins with the submission of an application by producer organizations; individual persons can also submit such an application if they are the only producers in a given area. The application must include, among other things, the specificity of the product (its name, description, production stages, connection with a specific geographical area). The submitted application is checked in terms of formal requirements. After completing the full procedure, the application is submitted to the European Commission. The second stage of the procedure begins at the European Commission level. Temporary protection is granted from the moment the application is submitted to the committee until the decision is issued. Within six months of receiving the application, the European Commission carries out formal checks on the application. If the committee decides that the application meets all the requirements, it decides to publish the shortened application in the Official Journal of the European Union. Objections to product registration may be submitted within six months from the date of publication. If the objection is not submitted or is rejected, the name is entered in the register of protected geographical indications kept by the European Commission.³¹

The uniqueness and attempt to protect the *obwarzanek krakowski*, which is the main character of this chapter, dates

³¹ Official website of the Patent Office of the Republic of Poland, access February 2024, <https://uprp.gov.pl/pl/przedmioty-ochrony/oznaczenia-geograficzne/oznaczenia-geograficzne-w-systemie-wspolnotowym>.

back to the beginning of the 21st century. Under the Act of December 17, 2004, on the registration and protection of names and designations of agricultural products, foodstuffs, and traditional products, the National List of Traditional Products was established.³² The purpose of this list was to encourage producers of regional and traditional food to prepare appropriate documentation, register their own products that meet statutory requirements, and thus promote them. The requirements that the entered product must meet include: being a product whose unique features and quality result from traditional production methods practiced for at least 25 years, and additionally, the product must meet the condition of determining the identity of local communities and be part of its cultural heritage. Without a doubt, obwarzanek krakowski fulfills all the above criteria, so the applicants could start preparing their application for entry on the list. After preparing the application, the next stage of registration was to submit the registration application to the voivodeship marshal, who asked the Chamber of Commerce for an opinion on the application. After the marshal accepted the application, it was forwarded to the Minister for Agricultural Markets, who entered the product on the list.³³ In the case of obwarzanek krakowski, this product was entered on the List of Traditional Products

³² Ustawa z dnia 17 grudnia 2004 r. o rejestracji i ochronie nazw i oznaczeń produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych oraz o produktach tradycyjnych, Dz.U.2022.0.2268.

³³ Official website of European fund for the development of the Polish countryside, access April 2024, <https://www.produkty-tradycyjne.pl/lista-produktow-tradycyjnych-mrirw>.

on November 28, 2006, in the bakery and confectionery products category.³⁴

However, including the obwarzanek on the list of traditional products was only the first step towards protection and promotion of this local specialty. One of the tasks of the List of Traditional Products is also to encourage and prepare producers of products included on the list to apply for one of the European certificates mentioned in the earlier parts of this chapter. The procedure for granting the mark began with the preparation of the required documentation and application. The applicants were a group of obwarzanek producers gathered at the Jura Chamber of Commerce, represented by Grzegorz Czaja, Kazimierz Czekaj, and Adam Ścibor.³⁵ In 2007, the prepared application was submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. It met the formal requirements and was entered into the internal register of applications.³⁶ After completing the national procedure, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development submitted the application to the Eu-

³⁴ Official website of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, access April 2024, <https://www.gov.pl/web/rolnictwo/obwarzanek-krakowska>.

³⁵ Official application paper of Obwarzanek krakowski on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, access April 2024, <https://www.gov.pl/web/rolnictwo/produkty-zarejestrowane-jako-chronione-nazwy-pochodzenia-chronione-oznaczenia-geograficzne-oraz-gwarantowane-tradycyjne-specjalnosci>.

³⁶ Announcement of the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development in the case of November 6, 2007 regarding the application for registration of the name: obwarzanek krakowski as a protected geographical indication, Official journal of the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development nr 32, 842.

ropean Commission. The committee also examined the application in terms of formal correctness. Once correctness of the submitted application was confirmed, in accordance with the procedure, the committee decided to publish a shortened version of the application in the Official Journal of the European Union on February 16, 2010.³⁷ From that moment on, the 6-month deadline for submitting an objection began. Due to the fact that the committee did not receive any statement of objection, the procedure ended with the obwarzanek being included in the list of register of Protected Geographical Indications on October 30, 2010.³⁸

Conclusion

The example of obwarzanek krakowski shows that heritage does not have to be only beautiful old buildings or paintings, but also traditions and culinary culture proving the uniqueness of a given country or region, which deserves not only protection but also wide promotion.

³⁷ Official shortened version of the application paper of Obwarzanek krakowski on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XC0216\(01\), C 38/8](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XC0216(01),C_38/8).

³⁸ COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 977/2010 of October 29, 2010 registering in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications name [Obwarzanek krakowski (ChOG)], Official journal of the European Union, L 285/15.

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Skopje: The Multi-Heritage of a Divided City

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Abstract

This paper delves into the intricate dynamics of politics, identity, and architectural evolution of Skopje, the capital of North Macedonia, employing a multifaceted approach. Utilising theoretical frameworks from post-colonial studies such as Orientalism and Balkanism, the paper navigates the complex landscape of regional geopolitics and cultural portrayals that have influenced Skopje's historical trajectory. It explores the post-independence period, studying the challenges arising from conflicting narratives of identity and heritage, particularly amidst disputes with neighbouring states regarding symbols and historical interpretations. At the heart of the discussion lies the Skopje 2014 project, an ambitious urban redevelopment aiming to redefine the city's (and the nation's) identity by incorporating elements of ancient and European heritage into its architecture. By scrutinising the project's implications for nationalism, modernity, and European integration, the study

sheds light on the tensions between tradition and progress, localism and globalisation, inherent in the Macedonian socio-political milieu. This paper discusses the complexities of negotiation of identity and heritage in a post-socialist society.

Keywords: Skopje, architecture, heritage

The Balkans is the name of a region – a part of the world whose borders are difficult to identify clearly. The word made its greatest career in the domain of diplomacy and politics in the 19th century, eventually becoming a stigmatising label, an expression related to irrational conflict and civilisational backwardness. The process of shaping the meanings and resonating semantic fields of the word was reconstructed by Maria Todorova in her classic “Imagining the Balkans”,¹ pointing first and foremost to its suggestive conventionality. “Balkans” has become a repository of qualities – diverse and contradictory, but above all pejorative.

As a region of Europe – although culturally and geographically an integral part of it – Balkans has been constituted as an internal Other, as a mediocre and inferior annex. The West, as a universalist starting point, arbitrarily knitted together with progress and modernity, possesses a disciplinary gaze that is a bundled transaction: simultaneously defines the imbalance of power (in the colonial sense), fabricates the character of the disciplined and becomes a perspective through which it views itself in an idealised form, sustaining fantasy of the self.

¹ Maria Todorova, “Imagining the Balkans”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Imagining the Balkans is thus focussed in the West's gaze as its construct and a cognitive *cliché* – a value-laden and essentialist one that situates itself in the field of reflection of Orientalist or imperialist studies rather than actual geography.

The concept of Orientalism is organised around an asymmetry as “implacably dissonant Otherness that cannot be rendered intelligible within the interpretive frame of the European Subject”² a mismatch, an alien and untranslatable difference within the opposition: centre/periphery, rational/irrational, civilisation/barbarism etc. This binary logic is a method that generates a discursive reality, but as a concept rather than a real place. Meanwhile, although these theories are overlapping on many levels, Balkanism is not merely a sub-variant of Orientalism. Balkanisation imposes a certain negative image, but at the same time it is a condition that guarantees the completeness of the images of self and the Other. In a sense, the Balkans are needed for Europe to project its unwanted onto.

The discourse of Balkanism is a wrenching between Occidentalism and Orientalism: essentializing the narrative of the self in need of the Other who functions as a constantly reconstructed counterpoint. “There is no Balkan” – as Katerina Kolozva puts it – “there are only processes in which Europeans project ‘Balkanness’ onto each other. There is no Balkans, there is only Balkanisation.”³ Milica Bakic'-Hayden argues that in the former Yugoslavia, “orientalism is a subjective practice by which all ethnic groups define the ‘other’ as

² Katerina Kolozova, “Slavoj Zizek imagining the Balkans”, *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society* Vol. 16 (2011): 301.

³ *Ibid.*: 302.

‘East’ from them; in doing so, they not only orientalise the ‘other’, but also occidentalise themselves as the West of the ‘other’”⁴ This is how Slavoj Žižek illustrates it:

*Consider the Balkans. They are portrayed in the liberal Western media as a vortex of ethnic passion – a multiculturalist dream turned into a nightmare. The standard reaction of a Slovene (...) is to say: ‘yes, this is how it is in the Balkans, but Slovenia is not part of the Balkans; it is part of Mitteleuropa; the Balkans begin in Croatia or in Bosnia; we Slovenes are the last bulwark of European civilisation against the Balkan madness’. If you ask, ‘Where do the Balkans begin?’ you will always be told that they begin down there, towards the south-east. For Serbs, they begin in Kosovo or in Bosnia where Serbia is trying to defend civilised Christian Europe against the encroachments of this Other.*⁵

This wrenching from imposed, essentialist patterns of representation from the outside to relativising one’s own identity in relation to the neighbouring Other is a discursive mechanism that Suzana Milevska sees through the (grammatical) category of ‘neither’: (...) neither completely Eastern nor completely Western (...). Neither pushes forward and backwards the already existing concepts, and thus creates new

⁴ Foreword by Michael Herzfeld in: Dusan I. Bjelic, Obrad Savic, “Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation”, (London, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002): 4.

⁵ Slavoj Žižek, ““You May!”: the post-modern superego”, London Review of Books Vol. 21 No. 6 (1999).

‘folds’ in the regimes of representation”. ‘Neither’, she writes, is “about going through an ultimate process of acquiring some kind of desired identity opposed to the pre-destined one but is marked by a restless chain of negotiations”:⁶ eternal entrapment in the logic of catching up – running away.

This begs the question – how can the Balkans become European? By recognising the full illusory nature of the imposed label, thus becoming a fully-fledged part of Europe again, *a posteriori* as it were? Or by admitting that there is, after all, a Balkan reality that remains to be embodied in a normative, universal Europeanness?

Todorova provides the answer to the question of the ‘Balkan’ character, culture, mentality only in the preface to the second Serbian edition of her “Imagined Balkans”. “Cultural Balkans”, she points out, “are the characteristics that unite nations with a specific relationship to heritage and tradition.”⁷ Todorova does not elaborate on this thesis, but Irena Sawicka and Jolanta Sujecka argue that a peculiar, cultural-mental feature of the Balkans is also ‘borderlandness’ and multi-level convergence, an intense fluidity of identity.⁸

As a development of these theses, I would like to present the recent project of reconstruction of Skopje – the city I have had the opportunity to personally observe for over a decade. Not only in terms of the changes of the capital’s architecture.

⁶ Suzana Milevska, “Balkan Subjectivity as *Neither*”, *Third Text*, 21:2 (2007): p 181.

⁷ Irena Sawicka, Jolanta Sujecka, “Wprowadzenie do bałkanologii. Etnosy – Języki – Arealy – Konceptualizacje”, (Warszawa: Sławistyczny Ośrodek Wydawniczy Instytutu Sławistyki PAN, 2015), 197.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Many social and political changes have taken place before my eyes, which today are already historical events. There were mass protests and rallies of support (2015), storm of the parliament (2017), law on the introduction of Albanian as a second official language (2019), accession to NATO (2020). And above all, there was the change of the country's name from Macedonia to North Macedonia in 2018, known as the 'Prespa Agreement', which stirred up controversy and ended nearly three decades-long dispute with neighbouring Greece.⁹ Many of these political developments, meanwhile, had a direct impact on the state of the city and the narratives that govern it.

An analysis of the socio-political events of the last couple of years will help to prove that the flywheel that shapes the reality of this city is both: a specific attitude to heritage and an attitude that is motivated by the logic of Balkanism – Orientalizing the Other while legitimising self as linked to the West. To develop this argument I will use Alexander Kiossev's concept of self-colonisation, which, as Jan Sowa notes, "draws attention to the relationship between two phenomena that are not always grasped together: the formation of a national identity and dependency taking on a quasi-colonial form".¹⁰

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In 1991, Macedonia officially separated from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As part of its new identity, the country replaced the red five-pointed star on its flag with the

⁹ Vasiliki P. Neofotistos, *Macedonia and Identity Politics After the Prespa Agreement*, (Routledge: 2022).

¹⁰ Jan Sowa, "Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowocześnie formą", (Kraków: Universitas, 2011), 23.

golden sun of Vergina, a symbol associated with the Argead dynasty, ancient rulers of the Kingdom of Macedonia. This emblem gained significance following its discovery by Greek archaeologist Manolis Andronikos in a tomb near the village of Vergina, west of Thessaloniki, in 1976. However, Greece strongly opposed Macedonia's adoption of this symbol, citing concerns about potential territorial claims. Consequently, four years later, Macedonia decided to remove the Vergina sun from its flag.

The Bulgarians did not recognise the Macedonian language, the Serbs did not grant autocephaly to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, but the Greek claims still caused the most problems. First of all, as the Greeks claim, Macedonia has no right to call itself Macedonia. Macedonia is a province of northern Greece, with its capital in Thessaloniki, and Alexander the Great, his mum, dad, horse Bucephalus and most of his friends were Greek. So it could be called, for instance, "the Republic of Skopje" or anything else as long as the word Macedonia did not appear in the name. The dispute got stuck down in the clumsy acronym FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), which still entwined the desire for independence with the Yugoslavian heritage. Although sticking to this logic, as Norman Davies joked, it might as well have been the ridiculous FPITGRBBSOSY – "The Former Province of Illyria, Thrace, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Kingdom of Bulgaria, Serbia, Ottoman Empire, and again Serbia and Yugoslavia".¹¹

¹¹ Norman Davies, "Europa. Rozprawa historyka z historią", (Kraków: Znak, 1998), 166.

As Goran Janev notes, the first decade of the Macedonian transition differed from that of other European post-socialist countries.¹² It was not characterised by an ardent and demonstrative negation of the Yugoslav past. Quite the opposite was happening. Ilka Thiessen, a German anthropologist who conducted field research in Skopje in the first half of the 1990s, recalls that small, private business owners in the fresh reality of the free market hung portraits of ex-communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, in their premises. Perhaps this becomes understandable especially in light of the economically exhausting embargo imposed by Greece due to the dispute over the ancient heritage. Moreover, in 2024, Tito's portraits are still hanging in the same premises in the old Turkish Bazaar. The past seems more optimistic than the future.

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Little has been done by those in power for a dozen years to improve the living conditions of Macedonians. The level of air pollution in Skopje is among the worst in Europe.¹³ Similarly, the Gini index, which determines wealth disparity. In the background, a galloping economic crisis, deregulation

¹² Goran Janev, "Contesting ethnocratic spatial order: narrative spaces in Skopje". Accessed 16.02.2024, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/46835/ssoar-eqpam-2016-2-janev-Contesting_ethnocratic_spatial_order_narrative.pdf;jsessionid=934203FD0AAD96D3AC3014D0816C2DBD?sequence=1.

¹³ Average PM2.5 concentration in the most polluted capital cities in Europe in 2022, accessed 16.02.2024, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1220938/most-polluted-capital-cities-in-europe/>.

of institutions and unemployment reaching 40 per cent in 2004.¹⁴ “Never-ending” political transformation has reduced the spectrum of agendas of all political parties to European integration, which Greece has effectively blocked for more than a quarter of a century anyway. Europe has become both the rod and the fish. A remedy for the shortcomings of the political future and a Big Other that levels quality: demands, imposes and sets standards.

Since 2005, Macedonia has been designated as a “candidate country”. This primarily entails political and socio-legal reform commitments. Conditions and goals were set in Brussels so that from there, efforts to normalise on the road to Europe could be monitored and subject to the discipline of praise or warning. Above all, the process of ‘Europeanisation’ indicated not only the goal of aspiration, but at the same time the subordination and recognition of one’s own position as a peripheral ‘culture of lack’ – triggering the panicky trauma of the need to ‘catch up’ and legitimise one’s own ‘specificity’.

Internalised peripherality began to demand visibility and recognition, but within the framework of Europe’s rules and order, according to its practices and hierarchy. This process only began to intensify a quarter of a century after independence, in 2006, with the coming to power of the Christian-nationalist political party VMRO-DPMNE.

In 2010, Prime Minister Gruevski, president of the nationalist party in power, presented a visualisation entitled “Macedonia Timeless” which depicted proposed capital’s re-development. Few believed that the ancient, quasi-baroque

¹⁴ <https://tradingeconomics.com/macedonia/unemployment-rate>.

and pseudo-classical design of Skopje 2014 – orgiastic and grand – would one day become flesh. In connection with the postulated style of reconstruction, the term ‘antiqueisation’, a term coined by historians to explain the phenomenon of giving a city the apparel of ancient Rome or Athens, began to appear more and more frequently in media discourse¹⁵. When visualisations of the conversion of a 1970s modernist department store into a gazebo of the gods of Olympus, with an imitation of the Spanish Steps, hit the internet, the bar was set high. Where the imagination had not reached before.

Around forty sites were proposed. A few years later, there were a hundred more in total. All in the proverbial ‘neo-Baroque’ style, and including: storied garages, town squares, public buildings, fountains, bridges, a Ferris wheel, two galleries on the Vardar and dozens of monuments. The cost estimate was initially 80, though today it stands at just under €700 million,¹⁶ making it approximately 1/10 of the GDP,¹⁷ while the average earnings in the country in 2014 – just over €350 – were the lowest in the region.

So if it is not the aesthetics and density of the monuments that are to become the relevant test of legitimacy and meaning, the picture is completed by the costs incurred in the face of real, everyday economic challenges. More than a measure

¹⁵ Anastas Vangeli, “Nation-building ancient Macedonian style: the origins and the effects of the so-called antiquization in Macedonia”, (London: Routledge, 2011), *Nationalities Papers*, 39:1, 13–32.

¹⁶ Скопје 2014 под лупа, accessed: 16.02.2024, <https://skopje2014.prizma.birn.eu.com>.

¹⁷ Alexander Clapp, “Skopje, City On the Make”, *The Baffler* No. 32 (2016), 8–13.

of common sense or budget management, then, it indicates the scale of the determination to respond to issues of identity and dignity.

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In such a context of political deadlock on the road to Euro-integration and a crisis in neighbourly relations motivated by mutual grievances over culture, language and history, the socio-political crisis began to seek its outlet – the confirmation of its existence in historical time. The figure of Alexander the Great and his empire was well suited to this because of its universalistic and pompous rhetorical potential. Although ancient and Slavic Macedonians are separated by a good few hundred years. These foundations of heritage nevertheless became a means of homogenising the nation. In psychological terms, this process could be interpreted as a compensatory mechanism to regain lost dignity. Vangel Bozhinovski, one of the Macedonian architects, author of the Mother Teresa Memorial House within the project Skopje 2014 said:

All other peoples have their roots in the likes of Gods or kings but you come from the mosquitoes from beyond the Carpathian Mountains. (...) Because you are stripped of your roots and pride, you would require an authority to endorse you. (...) our most talented and brightest students (...) feel inferior to anyone from the outside, any foreigner, because during their education they have been repeatedly told that all foreigners are better.¹⁸

¹⁸ “Macedonia Timeless”, accessed: 17.02.2024, <https://youtu.be/h6XBrFB1MbQ>.

The stronger the feelings of shame and guilt, the more vehement political movements will become. Macedonia thus found itself in urgent need of recreating its own complementary specificity – history and identity, visions of the past and future – meanings animated by the study of national historiography, ethnography, archaeology or folklore. It is a situation that Alexander Kiossev calls self-colonisation – ‘hegemony without dominion’ – “in this desire they had already interiorized the concepts, values, and symbolic hierarchies of the colonisers”.¹⁹

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References to Alexander the Great have never before escaped as foundations of Macedonian identity. A 2013 survey by the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities in Skopje shows²⁰ that identification with the ancient period and Alexander the Great among ethnic Macedonians is at a level of less than 10 per cent. Even though it is a heritage that is, after all, referenced by communities from the Balkans to Asia. But nowhere does it perhaps create as much controversy as it does here, among native Macedonians.

The project has divided public opinion roughly in half. It has polarised public debate into ‘patriots’ and ‘traitors’, thus

¹⁹ <http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation/html/s/self-colonization/the-self-colonizing-metaphor-alexander-kiossev.html>.

²⁰ See Katerina Kolozova, “Project and its Effects on the Perception of Macedonian Identity Among the Citizens of Skopje. Policy Brief”, (Skopje: Institute for Social Sciences and Humanities, 2013), accessed: 16.02.2024, <http://www.isshs.edu.mk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/1.-sk2014-eng.pdf>.

confronting Macedonians with the absurd choice of their heritage – “Slavic” or “ancient”. And as Jasna Koteska notes – perhaps the greatest paradox in this struggle for identity is that the left has found itself on the side of defending the status quo in its resistance to nationalism.²¹

“The root searching (...) discourse in self-colonizing cultures came about as a tool of this half-hearted resistance. (...) it accompanied the emergence of the nation in the form of a compensatory autochthonous ideology providing a natural hotbed for local strident nationalisms”²² Kiossev writes. “Europeanisation” and “return to true identity” continued to be the chief slogans of the ruling party, and already as such, installed asymmetries in the public imagination, justifying and legitimising the mechanisms of symbolic reconfiguration. In the first of the short clips promoting Project Skopje 2014, shown on government television, an off-screen voice narrated the coming changes:

And you (...) with your eyes wide open with which you looked at European cities and dreamed of a capital proud, not a city. Above all, for all of you who were tired of the socialist realist greyness and the concrete glades where buildings appeared, designed to separate us from beauty, because it was an aesthetic

²¹ Jasna Koteska, “Troubles with History: Skopje 2014”, ARTMargins Online, MIT Press, December 2011. Accessed: 19.02.2024, <https://artmargins.com/troubles-with-history-skopje-2014/>.

²² Alexander Kiossev, “The Self-Colonizing Metaphor”, accessed on: 18.02.2024: <http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation/html/s/self-colonization/the-self-colonizing-metaphor-alexander-kiossev.html>.

*of decadence that corrupted their communist morality. (...)
And you, who were born in independent Macedonia and wonder why your country should be forbidden to have a memory and a history of its own.*

It is worth elaborating at this point that the ‘concrete glades’ and ‘socialist realist grey’ referred to in the narrator’s voice is an international, brutalist urban and architectural project that was created by the efforts of dozens of countries after the earthquake of 63’, which turned almost 80 per cent of the city into rubble. Back then Skopje emerged as a hub for pioneering experimentation in modern global architecture. Yet, fifty years later it was to experience another ‘earthquake’, which literally turned futuristic concrete blocks into buildings reminiscent of European neo-classicism with the help of glued-on layers of polystyrene foam.

This is the moment when the moral and aesthetic axis valuing the two ideological orders – past, anomalous socialism and national, proud newness – is clearly pronounced²³. To dispel doubts, the ruling party has built a museum of the struggle for independence and the memory of the victims of the communist regime.

The ambitions of the Skopje 2014 project – to Europeanise the heritage, to shorten the distance to the civilisational superpogo, to gain the approval of the colonial centre – were all the more violent the more successive crises provoked political

²³ Christian Voss suggests that the ethnification of Macedonian society is undertaken to fill the void left by the loss of Yugoslav identity. See: Christian Voss, “Great Macedonia as a ‘mental map’ in the 20th and 21st century”. *Sprawy Narodowościowe*, 2007 (31), 163–169.

disregard for the West – the ‘significant other’. This did not facilitate “finding the right measure for one’s own tradition (...). Groups deprived of the privilege of an aesthetic disposition (...) succumbed to it. As a result, emancipating cultures were generously granted only one right – the right to inspire, or, in the reductionist variant, to imitate”.²⁴ It is for this reason that the Skopje 2014 Project chose to retrospect European styles that imitated the Baroque and Renaissance, even though they never existed here due to several centuries of Ottoman Turkish rule. As Ophélie Véron notices: “Western history and traditions were borrowed in an attempt to anchor an already established narrative, which was itself foreign to the region”.²⁵ In other words, the aesthetics of the renovated capital was to resemble the style of the second half of the 19th century, which in Western Europe overlapped with the period of the emergence of modern nation states: “an old-fashioned pride and dignity of a bourgeois capital of a superstate”.²⁶

As Magda Szcześniak writes: “being the result of inept practices of imitation, excess represents a failure of the colonised subject, it is also an element that sustains mimicry, confirming the necessity of continuing the process of colo-

²⁴ Grażyna Szwat-Gyłybowa, “(Nie)konwencjonalny trakt outsidera. O dylematach bułgarskich intelektualistów”, in “Topografia tożsamości. Tom 2”, ed. Agata Firlej, Wojciech Józwiak (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2012), 40.

²⁵ Ophélie Véron, “Deconstructing the Divided City: Identity, Power, and Space in Skopje”, University College London Department of Geography, 137. Accessed: 20.02.2024: <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1470032/2/Ophélie%20Véron%20Thesis.pdf>.

²⁶ Jasna Koteska, *op. cit.*, 3.

nisation (in this case, learning modernity)”²⁷ Although she was writing at the time about social change in Poland in the era of transition, the passage still maintains its relevance as a reflection of colonial relations: the failure of the colonised subject to accurately imitate the coloniser actually serves to perpetuate the colonial relationship, reinforcing the need for ongoing domination and control.

Imitation, meanwhile, does not only characterise the style in which the capital was rebuilt. It also applies to the building material. This is well illustrated by the words of the then prime minister and originator of the project during one of the recorded phone calls from the huge wiretapping scandal, the publication of which led in 2015 to the largest protests in the country’s independent history:

Nikola Gruevski: Mile, when is this call about the AEK (Agency for Electronic Communications) going to open? It’s a large price difference depending on whether it’s going to be marble or this... Nowadays, in the world they invented a kind of special cement which looks as if it’s... say it... as if it’s some marble, but it’s not marble.

At the same time the figures of the ancient soldiers lined up around the 10-metre-high plinth hold shields with a symbol deceptively reminiscent of the Vergina star. However, instead of sixteen arms, it has fifteen. In this way, it directly evokes associations with imitations of Western products, especially Adidas brand tracksuits, when the counterfeits were

²⁷ Magda Szcześniak, “Normy widzialności. Tożsamość w czasach transformacji”, (Warszawa: Fundacja Nowej Kultury Bęc Zmiana/ Instytut Kultury Polskiej UW, 2016), 38.

confusingly similar but had one more (or less) stripe. The huge figure on this very plinth in the city centre has, however, never been named Alexander of Macedon. Its official name is ‘Warrior on the Horse’.

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The appreciation of the city centre by its redevelopment has completed the sharp division between the shining monumentality and the Roma neighbourhood in deplorable condition. Its focal points are the luminous, pseudo-marble centre and the old, underfunded Turkish shopping district on the other side of the Vardar, which – at least according to colloquial perceptions – falls mostly to non-Slav Macedonians – Albanians, Roma, Turks. This stylistic shift goes hand in hand with the delimitation of the ‘unwanted heritage’, which firstly became the ‘identity brainwashing’ and ‘concrete’ associated project of the ‘city of solidarity’, but also the historical architecture of Old Bazaar. This is because it was built during the five centuries of Turkish Empire rule, which ethno-national rhetoric associates above all with yoke and backwardness ergo non-Europeanness, a culturally alien body.²⁸

With the need for ‘Europeanisation’ came the asymmetry inherent in it, the need to define the Other, to find the ‘barbarian’ and the ‘guilty’. The candidate was obvious. The Albanians, an orientalised and criminalised national minority that, in

²⁸ Although the division of Skopje into a ‘European’ and a ‘Balkan’ part on both sides of the Vardar had already begun to consolidate in the inter-war period.

addition, mostly adheres to Islam which, for the Macedonian public at large, is a direct link between the concepts of Ottoman rule, Islam and the Albanian minority.²⁹

The condensation and scale of this manifestation is, in this case, only a proxy for the degree of determination: identity was forcibly implanted in Macedonian society, leaving out the Slavic component and remaining silent about the centuries-old Ottoman legacy. The Skopje 2014 project highlighted all the more the inner split, the forward and backward movement that Suzana Smilevska called ‘neither’: the everyday presence of Oriental culture in architecture, language, religion, customs and the simultaneous declaration of belonging to the Western world.

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Skopje is organised by cyclical, radical and annihilating changes that fall upon the city by the force of political decisions. Brutalist reconstruction after the earthquake or ethno-national political baroqueisation – in both cases, the fate of the city was decided in the offices of politicians, without the participation of its inhabitants. However, the Macedonian capital still remains an inviolable space of traditional, neighbourhood communities of its inhabitants, stubbornly exercising their ‘right to the city’.

In defiance of the Macedonian-Albanian tensions of 2001, Old Bazaar has once again become a place of pulsating pluralism of languages, faiths and ethnicities: a young artistic

²⁹ Rozita Dimova, “Elusive centres of a Balkan city: Skopje between undesirable and reluctant heritage”, *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 25(4), 5.

life, debates and a club scene. This is one of those moments where the City has resisted political fixation, ignoring the nationalist assumption of homogeneity. Ironically, this same Bazaar was declared a ‘cultural heritage of special importance’ by UNESCO in 2008. This is a paradox – especially after years of neglect and a political narrative that attempted to portray the place as a dangerous hotbed of crime³⁰ or a place that ‘needed’ to be avoided.³¹

There are at least two cities of Skopje: the city of critique, vibrance and imagination; and the shiny city of turbo-culture and turbo-politics, wrote Katerina Kolozova.³²

In 2015, a citizens’ initiative organised the first initiatives to defend the modernist shopping centre from ‘baroqueisation.’ It was successful. The same year also saw cyclical, anti-government protests triggered by a political scandal. These protests took the name ‘colour revolution’, as participants threw coloured paint at the buildings, symbols of the regime, created as part of Project Skopje 2014. With the change of power the following year, the project was put on hold and the question arose – what next? The Macedonian pavilion at the 2018 Venice Biennale, in an attempt to answer these questions, presented itself with the meaningful title ‘Freeingspace’ and proposed architectural solutions to the ‘troublesome legacy’ of Skopje 2014.

In 2018, an agreement was signed. From then on, Macedonia gained a new part of its name – North Macedonia. Greece withdrew its veto on accession to the EU. Article 7

³⁰ Goran Janev, *op. cit.*

³¹ Rozita Dimova, *op. cit.*, 6.

³² Artan Sadiku, Katerina Kolozova, “The Struggles of Skopje” (Wrocław: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego, 2013), 82.

mentions that both countries acknowledge that their respective understanding of the terms ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian’ refers to a different historical context and cultural heritage. A commitment was made to revise the content of textbooks to satisfy the committee of historians on both sides of the dispute. As per Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Agreement, all monuments related to antiquity must be given new plaques indicating their connection to Hellenic ancient history. On August 15, 2019 central statue of “Warrior on the Horse” received a new plaque: “In honour of Alexander the Great, a historic figure belonging to the ancient Hellenic history and civilization and to the world cultural and historic heritage”. The new plaques were repeatedly vandalised in the days that followed their replacement on August 15, 2019. The new copper plaques were placed under constant video surveillance and attendant service.³³ This sparked protests on both sides of the border. In the same year, similar claims were made by Bulgaria, a member country with veto rights. Another commission was set up to trace the disputed figures of the common heritage. The commission is still working today.

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“Skopje is not a film, not a thriller where we guess the chief event. It is a concentration of man’s struggle for freedom, with a result which inspires further struggles and no acceptance of defeat”, wrote Sartre. Macedonian archaeologist Nikos Chau-

³³ R. Dimova, “The hollow signifier “PRESPA” Some reflections on the lake, the Agreement, and the state” in “Macedonia and Identity Politics After the Prespa Agreement” edited by Vasiliki P. Neofotistos, (London and New York: Routledge: 2022), 55.

sidis is also right when he says³⁴ that this city is not growing sideways, but one layer after another, in which successive rulers want to destroy what they have inherited from their predecessors. What is noteworthy, however, as Ophélie Véron proves, is that Skopje is “a divided city is an image before it becomes reality, which is achieved through a process shaped by top-down decisions”³⁵.

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³⁴ Никос Чаусидис, “Проектот Скопје 2014 – Скици За Едно Наредно Истражување”, accessed on 19.02.2024: <https://www.okno.mk/sites/default/files/082-Nikos-Chausidis-Skopje-2014.pdf>.

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Lenin in Poronin: An Analysis of the Difficult Heritage of the Podhale Region Based on the Actions of the Communist Authorities in Cultivating the Memory of the Leader of the Revolution

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Abstract

The subject of this work is the phenomenon of the emergence of the regional cult of Vladimir Lenin in Poronin after World War II. The starting point of the chapter is the historical outline of the era and the alleged ties of the leader of the Bolshevik Revolution with Podhale. Another part is an analysis of the communist authorities' post-World War II efforts to build a local Lenin cult in the form of: the establishment of a museum in Poronin in 1947 (which later became a branch of the Lenin Museum in Krakow), the construction of a Lenin

monument, numerous cultural texts – including films, guidebooks and poems from the communist period, or the creation of a mountain tourist trail which patron was the leader of the revolution. The main methodological tool of our work is a critical analysis of the literature on the subject and a community interview. The last section includes a description of the disappearance of various forms of the cult after 1989, and current approaches to the shameful cultural heritage and contemporary remnants are presented.

Keywords: Vladimir Lenin, commemoration, heritage, Poronin

Our work aims to present the attempt to build a cult of Vladimir Lenin in Poronin after World War II and the remnants of this phenomenon after 1989. In the first part, we will present the historical links of the leader of the revolution with Galicia. Then we will analyze the creation of historical memory around the cult of Lenin. For this, we will pay attention to the construction of memorials (a museum in 1947 in Poronin, the construction of a monument to Lenin) and the mass production of various cultural texts (films, guidebooks and poems from the communist period, as well as the creation of a mountain tourist trail). In order to understand these phenomena, the main methodological tool is a critical analysis of the available literature. In the last section, we will discuss the disappearance of the Lenin cult after 1989 and the current approaches of the region's residents. In our opinion, the Lenin cult in Podhale, despite strenuous attempts, never took root; after the political changes it became an inconvenient

legacy of a past era, and today its remnants are hard to find. Vladimir Lenin's ties with Małopolska date back to the period before World War I.¹ In the aftermath of the failed revolution of 1905 and the subsequent political situation in tsarist Russia, a significant number of anti-tsarist political activists decided to emigrate outside the Russian Empire, including Bolesław Czarkowski, Leon Trotsky, Adolf Joffe, Rosa Luxemburg, Józef Piłsudski, Peter the Painter, Lev Kamenev and Julius Martov. Lenin himself spent several years in Western Europe during this period.² In the spring of 1912, in order to be closer to Russia, he decided to move from France to Kraków in Galicia, which was ruled by the Habsburg dynasty.³ During this period, despite the tense relations between Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia, many political refugees and migrants from the Russian Empire stayed in Krakow, and the proximity of the border allowed for easier contact and correspondence with activists in the country.⁴ During this period, Lenin and his wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, spent part of their stay in Poland in Podhale.⁵ The couple spent five months in the region in 1913 and a vacation in 1914. The purpose of the stay was

¹ Louis Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1964), 90–100.

² Robert Service, *Lenin: A Biography* (Londyn: Macmillan 2000), 180–207.

³ Victor Sebestyen, *Lenin Dyktator* (Warszawa: Prószyński Media 2018), 266–268.

⁴ Histmag, “Lenin w Krakowie i Poroninie – epizod z życia rewolucjonisty”, Accessed December 22, 2023. <https://histmag.org/Lenin-w-Krakowie-i-Poroninie-epizod-z-zycia-rewolucjonisty-6804>.

⁵ Zofia Radwańska-Paryska, Witold Henryk Paryski, *Wielka encyklopedia Tatrzańska* (Poronin: Wydawnictwo górskie 1994), 643–644.

to improve health and change the air.⁶ They rented a house located in Biały Dunajec, close to the border with Poronin, which at that time was a popular destination for holidaymakers and patients. During his stay, Lenin took advantage of the natural values of the area. Lenin found himself in the Tatra Mountains at the outbreak of World War I. Due to his origins, he was recognized by the Austro-Hungarian authorities as a potential spy. For this reason, on August 8 he was interned for 10 days, which he spent in the detention center in Nowy Targ, and on August 19 he was released from custody due to his anti-tsarist activities and the intervention of socialist parliamentarians and local social activists he met.⁷ Due to the hostilities in Galicia, he and his wife decided to leave the country. After obtaining the necessary documents and preparing the move, he moved with his wife to neutral Switzerland. He stayed there until 1917, when in the spring he went to St. Petersburg with the help of Germany.⁸ In October of that year, he led the October Revolution. From the perspective of Lenin's overall biography, the period of ties with Galicia is an insignificant episode, overlooked in biographies.

In the aftermath of World War II, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe found themselves in the Soviet sphere

⁶ Robert Service, *Lenin: A Biography* (Londyn: Macmillan 2000), 202–207.

⁷ Maciej Mętrak, “Cokół do wynajęcia – muzeum i pomnik W.I. Lenina w Poroninie w pamięć współczesnych mieszkańców Podhala” in *Co słyszać na Podhalu. Tradycja we współczesności* ed. Małanicz-Przybylska Maria (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2014), 193–194.

⁸ Louis Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1964), 105–110.

of influence. The new authorities in each satellite state began to redefine their politics of remembrance and their approach to cultural heritage according to the patterns of action taken from the USSR. An important area of interest for the new Polish authorities was the commemoration of activists of merit for the communist movement. The politics of remembrance in the satellite countries were influenced by the old factional struggles and changes within the Bolshevik Party. One of the key figures in the cult throughout the period of the USSR's domination of the region was Vladimir Lenin, who was the father of the Bolshevik movement and the first leader of the USSR. For this reason, the period of Lenin's life associated with Małopolska became the subject of interest of the communist authorities and artists sympathetic to it. The first step was to record and archive materials, personal belongings and documents that had survived World War II (left in a hurry in the summer of 1914). Researchers were also sent to the Tatra Mountains in order to collect oral traditions and memories of the region's inhabitants who had direct contact and remembered the visits of the future leader of the revolution to the region. In 1947, with the support of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, the Lenin Museum was established in Poronin, and 7 years later the Lenin Museum in Krakow was established with its headquarters on Topolowa Street. The branch in Poronin and the house in Zwierzyniec (a district Kraków) were subordinated to the main unit on Topolowa Street.⁹ The museum

⁹ Maciej Mętrak, "Plinth for rent – museum and monument of V.I. Lenin in Poronin in memory of contemporary inhabitants of Podhale" in *Co słycać na Podhalu. Tradition in the Present Times*, ed. Małanicz-Przybylska Maria (Warsaw: Warsaw University Press, 2014), 196–198.

in Poronin itself consisted of two institutions. The main building was the former inn of Paweł Gut-Mostowy, which was originally considered to be Lenin's place of residence. Later, when it was discovered that he had actually rented a house in Biały Dunajec from Teresa Skupie, this place became a department of the main unit, which was the former inn.¹⁰ In 1950, a statue of Lenin was erected in front of the house in Biały Dunajec, the monument would later become the subject of controversy.

Another important element of the commemoration of the leader of the revolution were cultural texts. As part of the process of building a cult, a number of publications, poems and newsreels were published. Julian Tuwim is credited with being the author of the poem 'Lenin w Poroninie' (eng. Lenin in Poronin). However, the mistake in identifying the author of the poem was not unfounded. Tuwim had in his artistic output many works relating to communist ideas. The author himself, in the post-war period, was fond of communism, subjecting the Sanation period to criticism. This information is so widespread that it also appears in the mouths of leading representatives of the musical and political scene.¹¹ This is due to the fact that such information was disseminated during the communist era and the poem itself was taught in a shortened, 10-11 verse version. However, the actual author of the original 30 verse original was the less popular contemporary Janusz

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ For example: Robert Sankowski, "Co ma w głowie Paweł Kukiz? Przesłuchaliśmy wszystkie jego płyty" Accessed December 28, 2023 <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75410,18266578,co-ma-w-glowie-pawel-kukiz-przesluchalismy-wszystkie-jego-plyty.html>.

Minkiewicz. A lot of poems, short readings about Vladimir Lenin were in the canon of school readings.¹² In 1966, in Polish-Soviet cooperation, a feature film “Lenin in Poland” was shot. The film tells the story of Lenin’s life in the years 1913–1914, and the plot covers the events of the first phase of the war. It was awarded at the 1966 Cannes Film Festival.¹³ In addition to the above-mentioned methods of creating a cult, it is also worth mentioning the creation of the Lenin Trail. The mountain tourist route was established in 1952 as part of the project of the so-called freedom trails to commemorate the struggles for national liberation and social equality. The route led from Zakopane through popular mountain attractions ending at the Lenin Museum in Poronin. Lenin himself probably during his stay honored the trail and visited some of the popular places placed later on the trail.¹⁴ The name itself did not come into common use.

The cult of Lenin aroused social tensions during its existence. Some of the museum’s employees occasionally felt social ostracism associated with their work, especially at the extreme stage of communist rule.¹⁵ Vandals often targeted Lenin Trail

¹² Karolina Jędrych, “Lektury w programach dla szkoły podstawowej z lat 1949-1989” (Katowice: RE-BUŚ repository of the University of Silesia in Katowice).

¹³ Filmweb, “Lenin w Polsce”, Accessed December 28, 2023. <https://www.filmweb.pl/film/Lenin+w+Polsce-1965-7245>.

¹⁴ Zofia Radwańska-Paryska, Witold Henryk Paryski, *Wielka encyklopedia Tatrzańska* (Poronin: Wydawnictwo górskie 1994), 643–644.

¹⁵ Maciej Mętrak, “Cokół do wynajęcia – muzeum i pomnik W.I. Lenina w Poroninie w pamięć współczesnych mieszkańców Podhala” in *Co słyhać na Podhalu. Tradycja we współczesności* ed. Małanicz-Przybylska Maria (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2014), 199.

markings and information boards. The largest action against the cult of Lenin took place in the spring of 1970. As a result of the rising tide of social dissatisfaction at the end of Władysław Gomułka's rule, a group of anti-communist opposition activists associated with the "Ruch" organization decided to set fire to the museum and blow up the statue of Lenin. The operation, codenamed "Poronin", despite thorough preparations, did not come to fruition as a result of a denunciation. On the day before the action, some of the activists associated with the action were arrested by the Security Service. In the end, 24 people were detained, including Benedykt Czum, Stefan and Marek Niesiołowski and Wiesław Kęcik. As a result of the unmasking, the organization was dismantled.¹⁶ In the course of the communist era, the cult of Lenin transformed ideologically, getting rid of its original meaning. During the period of increased anti-communist opposition activity, surveillance of memorial objects was intensified. As mentioned at the beginning, from the perspective of the revolutionary leader's life, the period of ties with Galicia is an insignificant episode often overlooked by biographers. Due to a number of coincidences and strenuous propaganda efforts during the communist period, the connection between Poronin and Vladimir Lenin took root in the collective memory. However, despite the efforts of the communist authorities, this actions did not translate into a foundation for a massive social cult in Podhale region.

¹⁶ Przystanek historia "Akcja "Poronin". Jak członkowie tajnej organizacji "Ruch" postanowili wysadzić pomnik i podpalić muzeum Lenina", accessed: December 29, 2023. <https://przystanekhistoria.pl/pa2/tematy/mlodziez/32215,Akcja-Poronin-Jak-czlonkowie-tajnej-organizacji-Ruch-postanowili-wysadzic-pomnik.html>.

In the face of transformation, there was a socially initiated process of violently removing Lenin from Poronin. Back in 1989, the name of the street was changed. The museum and the monument were removed a year later. Interestingly, the demise of the monument, was a grassroots initiative of the residents, which can be read as both a general upsurge in response to the political and social changes, as well as an expression of resistance against the legacy of a passing era imposed over decades. The monument was demolished and taken to the Lublin region, where it found its place in the Socialist Realism Gallery at the Zamoyski Palace in Kozłowka near Lublin, as did some of the museum's exhibits. The memory of both the museum and Vladimir Lenin himself in the Podhale region can be judged, nowadays, as being merely anecdotal. Nowadays, the only remaining part of the museum is the building, without any historical context or information provided. On the other hand, the very topic of the leader's presence reappeared in discourse through the film "Niebezpieczni Dżentelmeni" (eng. "Dangerous Gentlemen") in Maciej Kawalski's directorial debut, where the leader of the revolution was portrayed, according to Maciej Pinkwart¹⁷ in an interview conducted by Bartłomiej Kuraś¹⁸ for

¹⁷ "Maciej Pinkwart – Polish author of several tourist guides to Zakopane, Paris, Slovakia, France and Greece, novels and poetry volumes, radio and newspaper journalist, documentary filmmaker, curator of the Szymanowski Museum, historian of Zakopane, organiser of musical life in Zakopane, lecturer and teacher." Accessed December 28, 2023 <https://lubimyczytac.pl/autor/16484/maciej-pinkwart>.

¹⁸ Bartłomiej Kuraś. "Lenin i Piłsudski na Podhalu, czyli prawdziwa historia niebezpiecznych dżentelmenów pod Tatrami" Accessed December 28, 2023 <https://zakopane.wyborcza.pl/zakopane/7,179294,29991675,lenin-i-pilsudski-na-podhalu-czyli-prawdziwa-historia-niebezpiecznych.html>.

the “Gazeta Wyborcza” daily, in such a way that “If Lenin had been even partly such a moron as he was portrayed in the film about Podhale, the Bolsheviks would never have come to power, and Vladimir Vladimirovich would today be a stable boy with the Romanovs”. In the film itself, Lenin is portrayed during his time in Podhale as a man of low stature with a sordid disposition, who is hosted with honors by the locals. One might wonder about certain similarities with Sergei Yutkevich’s 1960s film, but in its decidedly heavily caricatured version. Because of this, as well as the general negative image of the region, the film was met with a wave of criticism from local circles, film critics and historians.

From time to time, the subject of an alleged renewal of the memory of the revolutionary leader appears in the local media space. However, it is usually a form of joke or an attempt to highlight certain problems related to the situation of the region and the Poronin municipality. Numerous fan-pages are created with the renewed activity of the aforementioned museum. In 2011, a member of the Poronin municipal council, Anna Malacina, proposed the reconstruction of the monument. In this initiative, she was supported by the then chairman of the parliamentary budget committee from the Platforma Obywatelska – Kazimierz Czekaj. However, this proposal met with much criticism from other councilors.¹⁹ In 2014, local artist Sławomir Cudzich-Bularz made an effigy of Lenin out of wood and placed it next to his property in

¹⁹ Bartłomiej Kuraś. “Lenin ogrodowy. Awantura o rzeźbę w Poroninie” September 24, 2014. Accessed December 28 2023. <https://krakow.wyborcza.pl/krakow/7,44425,16694384,lenin-ogrodowy-awantura-o-rzezbe-w-poroninie.html>.

Poronin. After a year, however, there was a decapitation of the statue by vandals,²⁰ which may go some way to illustrating the attitude of the municipality's residents to the issue at hand.

The cult of Lenin in Podhale is a complex and multi-faceted topic. The legacy of the museum and monument arouses extreme feelings in residents. On the one hand, as Maciej Mętrak writes and which is reflected in the interviews he conducted,²¹ we are dealing with the displacement of the Leninist legacy from the current Poronin highland ethos. On the other hand, there is nostalgia among the Highlanders for Poronin's lost national and international fame, now forgotten by the influence of Zakopane, which is the regional hegemon in terms of handling tourist traffic. Poronin became somewhat forgotten again after 1989. Determined by the political climate and regime coercion, tourism was completely eliminated and did not find an equally strong counterpart befitting the modern era. Poronin blended into the general climate of Podhale and lost its distinctive feature placing it on the tourist map of the country. The leader of the revolution remained somewhat alien throughout the period in which attempts were made to root his cult in the highland consciousness, and it was never fully introduced. Despite his actual presence in Biały Dunajec and Poronin, the memory of him had to be artificially created rather than actually existed. Despite the strenuous efforts of the communist authorities, the cult of Lenin in the direct, spontaneous and unartificial sense never fully developed.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Maciej Mętrak, "Cokół do wynajęcia – muzeum i pomnik W.I. Lenina w Poroninie w pamięć współczesnych mieszkańców Podhala", 199.

Rather, the propaganda machine in communist Poland treated the cult of Lenin as a side element and as a modest tool to justify other activities of the apparatus of oppression. Poronin as a municipality benefited significantly from the presence of the cult of Lenin from the perspective of general development and investment by the central government, ultimately becoming a place to which numerous excursions were made from workers' establishments coupled with the general development of the region's tourist resorts, however, it rather functions as a negative element in the consciousness of the inhabitants. We are briefly informed of the fact that there is a Lenin's museum in the current cultural center on the municipality's website.²² It is not elaborate and contains only basic facts. The legacy of a bygone era is not treated as something worthy of attention or commemoration. Similarly, there is no mention of the need to commemorate this element of the municipality's history in the Municipal Development Strategy 2016-2025, apart from the general need to revitalize the facilities and to make Poronin's tourist offer more attractive.²³ The document focuses on other elements attractive to the potential audience, such as local handicrafts, monuments of tangible and intangible cultural heritage present in the municipality, and deepening care for the environment and natural assets. In general terms, it can be said that nowadays the municipality does not regard the historical presence of Lenin as a distinguishing feature.

²² "Gminny Ośrodek Kultury w Poroninie" Accessed March 20. <https://www.poronin.pl/mieszkaniec/kultura-sport-i-turystyka/gminny-osrodek-kultury-w-poroninie/kontakt>.

²³ Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Poronin na lata 2016–2025, Annex to Resolution No. XVI/82/2015 of the Poronin Commune Council of December 23, 2015.

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